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ABsTRACT 
Med-Arb is a dispute resolution process that combines mediation 
and arbitration. Interest is increasing in Med-Arb because of a 
growing similarity between arbitration and litigation. As attor-
neys legalize and formalize mediation into a more evaluative 
and adversarial process, Med-Arb practitioners offer a process 
that guarantees a final resolution but incorporates informal op-
portunities for settlement. Thus, as both mediation and arbitra-
tion become increasingly formalized, Med-Arb is perceived as one 
way to correct the adversarial disadvantages of each by provid-
ing for both "finality" and "flexibility." However, the key princi-
ples of both mediation and arbitration are compromised by Med-
Arb. The core values of mediator neutrality, party self-determi-
nation, and confidentiality cannot be satisfied by Med-Arb. In 
arbitration, the promise of arbitrator impartiality, the due pro-
cess right to equal treatment and confrontation, and the enforce-
ability of the arbitral award are weakened. Separating the 
processes and utilizing different neutrals is the ideal way to gain 
the benefits of flexibility and finality without compromising ei-
ther process's core values. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Med-Arb is a dispute resolution process that combines mediation 
and arbitration_! The most common variety ofMed-Arb is 'same-neu-
tral,'2 where parties utilize a combined mediator/arbitrator and only 
proceed to arbitration if they do not reach a settlement in mediation. 
This Article discusses the same-neutral Med-Arb model where the 
same neutral mediates and then, if unsuccessful, arbitrates. 
Interest in Med-Arb is rising among neutrals who provide both 
mediation and arbitration services because ADR is becoming increas-
ingly legalized. Mediation is becoming more evaluative and adver-
sarial, arbitration and litigation are increasingly similar, and 
arbitration is viewed as too costly, too inefficient, and effectively, the 
"new litigation."3 Med-Arb practitioners see an opportunity to offer a 
process that combines the best of both mediation and arbitration by 
guaranteeing a final resolution ("finality") but incorporates informal 
opportunities for settlement ("flexibility"). The "finality" of arbitra-
tion is utilized as the stick to promote good behavior in mediation, 
while the "flexibility" of informal mediated discussions promotes effi-
ciency and cost-savings over the use of arbitration. Instead of a crea-
tive solution to the legalization of ADR, Med-Arb, as it is practiced, 
Med-Arb is contributing to the legalization of both processes, and as a 
result is actually part of the problem. 
1. See Martin C. Weisman, Med-Arb: The Best of Both Worlds, 19 DISP. RESOL. 
MAG. 40, 40 (2013) (explaining benefits of hybrid method); David J. McLean & Sean-
Patrick Wilson, Compelling Mediation in the Context of Med-Arb Agreements, 63 DISP. 
RESOL. J. 28, 30 (2008) (reporting increasing use of Med-Arb); Edna Sussman, Devel-
oping an Effective Med-Arb/Arb-Med Process, 2 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW. 71, 71 (2009) 
(describing increased attention to hybrid processes). 
2. See generally John T. Blankenship, Developing Your ADR Attitude: Med-Arb, 
a Template for Adaptive ADR, 42 TENN. B. J. 28 (2006). 
3. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 
u. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
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This Article demonstrates that despite efforts to provide flexibil-
ity and choice to prospective arbitrants, the key principles of both me-
diation and arbitration are compromised by Med-Arb. As presently 
practiced, Med-Arb cannot satisfy the core values of mediator neu-
trality, party self-determination, and confidentiality. Nor in arbitra-
tion are the promise of arbitrator impartiality, due process right to 
equal treatment and confrontation, and enforceability of the arbitral 
award likely to be achieved. Though Med-Arb promises to combine 
the best of both mediation and arbitration it does not remain faithful 
to the core values of their respective processes.4 Abandoning the 
Med-Arb format as an integrated unit and utilizing different neutrals 
is the ideal way to gain the benefits of flexibility and finality, and to 
counteract the negative impact of legalization all without compromis-
ing on the core values essential to the integrity and successful imple-
mentation of each process. 
In Part II, this Article describes the legalization of arbitration 
and mediation and the rise of mediation as the primary ADR process. 
It argues recent interest in Med-Arb stems from the growing similar-
ity between the practice of litigation and arbitration. It explains that 
Med-Arb is an effort to counter the increasing perception that arbi-
tration is too costly, too inefficient, and is effectively, the "new litiga-
tion."5 Med-Arb proponents argue that the blended process 
accomplishes this by utilizing both the efficiency and informality of 
mediation to avoid prolonged arbitration discovery and hearings, and 
the finality of arbitration to support the weaknesses of the "evalua-
tive" or "legalized" style of mediation.6 Part II concludes by arguing 
that these inherent weaknesses in each process that Med-Arb seeks 
to counteract are actually due to the negative effects of legalization 
on each process model. The "solution" offered by Med-Arb is built on a 
false premise that further legalization can correct legalization. Part 
III describes the ways in which Med-Arb is detrimental to the funda-
mental tenets of both mediation and arbitration and how, despite ef-
forts to the contrary, Med-Arb will only further legalize both 
processes. 
4. Brian A. Pappas, Med-Arb: The Best of Both Worlds May Be Too Good to Be 
True: A Response to Weisman, 19 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 42, 42 (2013). 
5. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 3. 
6. See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The "New Arbitration," 17 HARv. 
NEGOT. L. REv. 61, 66, 87-88 (2012) (describing the adversarial tactics common to 
"legal" mediation). 
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II. THE LEGALIZATION OF ADR AND THE MED-ARB "SOLUTION" 
Legalization of informal processes like mediation and arbitration 
exemplifY the tension between the problem solving goals of mediation 
and the adversarial system's twin aims of finality and justice. 7 This 
Article argues rising interest in Med-Arb is a result of the legaliza-
tion of arbitration and mediation. The following Section examines 
ways in which arbitrators are combining mediation with arbitration 
for the purposes of countering the negative effects of the legalization 
of both processes. 
Jerold Auerbach first noted the tendency of alternative dispute 
mechanisms to mimic formal processes over time.8 He describes how 
non-law dispute resolution systems, particularly small claims courts, 
commercial arbitration, and labor arbitration, among others, over 
time become significant parts of the legal system.9 Within the ADR 
community, neutrals and other practitioners view legalization as the 
process of co-optation of ADR, and mediation in particular, by the le-
gal field. 10 Legalization of ADR processes is also often the result of 
greater reliance on the legal system by participants, who will often 
frame their demands and grievances in informal processes in a 
"rights conscious" way.11 
A. The Legalization of Arbitration 
Consequently, the increasing interest in Med-Arb is primarily 
due to the legalization of arbitration and its resulting similarity with 
litigation. Despite litigation's downward trend, discontent with arbi-
tration has never been more widespread due to: (1) arbitration's in-
creasing similarity to litigation, (2) the rise of mediation, and (3) the 
enforcement of binding arbitration clauses in standardized adhesion 
contracts. 12 Arbitration now includes many of the features of a trial 
court13 including prehearing motion practice, prolonged discovery, 
extensive hearings to avoid claims of procedural injustice, and the 
7. Id. at 83. 
8. Jerold Auerbach, JusTICE WITHOUT LAw? 15 (1983). 
9. Id. at 15. 
10. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, infra note 85. 
11. Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: "Informed Disenchantment" 
and the Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 LAw & Soc'y REv. 783, 784-85 (2006) 
(describing China's transition from a reliance on the informal to a more formalistic, 
rights-based legal consciousness). 
12. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 5-7. 
13. Id. at 6-7. 
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erosion of the finality of arbitration awards. 14 Contrary to the initial 
expectation that arbitration was way to provide greater finality and 
efficiency at less cost than litigation,15 today, U.S. business arbitra-
tion is a formal, costly, and time-consuming mechanism.l6 For exam-
ple, seventy-five percent of experienced arbitrators surveyed in 2002 
believe "arbitration is becoming too much like court litigation and 
thereby losing its promise of providing an expedited and cost-efficient 
means of resolving commercial disputes."17 Similar to litigation, arbi-
tration is a formalized adversarial process designed to adjudicate 
rights with lawyers driving the process. 18 The next Section describes 
the preference for mediation, and why it is leading many arbitrators 
to promote Med-Arb. 
B. The Rise and Legalization of mediation 
Due to arbitration's trend toward litigiousness, mediation is 
quickly becoming the ADR "process of choice."19 First, mediation pro-
vides parties with a high degree of control over both the process and 
the agreement. 20 Second, the process is customizable and the scope of 
the discussion may extend beyond the dispute into communications 
and relationship issues.21 The solutions crafted can transcend the 
14. See id. at 6, 16 (citing Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, 
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2005, at 23, 25 fig.5). 
15. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 8. 
16. See e.g., Benjamin J. C. Wolf, On-line but Out of Touch: Analyzing Interna-
tional Dispute Resolution Through the Lens of the Internet, 14 CARDOZO J. lNT'L & 
COMP. L. 281, 281 (2006) (describing arbitration as similar to litigation in cost and 
length of discovery); Nicolas C. Ulmer, A Comment on "The 'Americanization' of Inter-
national Arbitration?," 16 MEALEYS lNT'L ARB. REP. 24, 24 (2001) (describing the use 
of hardball tactics in arbitration). 
17. Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58 DISP. 
RESOL. J. 37, 38 (2003). 
18. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 28 (stating "[arbitration and litigation] are both 
formalized adversary processes aimed at adjudicating rights and obligations ... "). 
19. Bush, infra note 71, at 111. 
20. Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three Processes Underlying 
Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Field Study of Mediation & Arbitration, 65 PER-
SONALITY & Soc. PsvcHOL. 1167, 1170 (1993) (describing the opportunity to control, 
negotiate and develop the outcome as reasons parties may value mediation over 
arbitration). 
21. See RoBERT A. BARUCH BusH & JosEPH P. FoLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIA-
TION: THE 'fRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT, 23-24 (2005). 
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typical forms of adjudicated relief into more creative, durable solu-
tions.22 As a result, unlike arbitration, mediation is viewed more fa-
vorably by attorneys on issues of cost,23 speed,24 confidentiality, 
satisfaction, and maintaining relationships. 
For example, businesses are increasingly turning to mediation as 
an alternative to arbitration to resolve disputes. 25 The International 
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), a major arbitration provider, prefer-
ences mediation in the absence of a specified settlement technique.26 
This is a departure from multi-step ADR clauses in contracts, which 
first required mediation, followed by arbitration and then litigation if 
necessary_27 In 2007, American Institute of Architects in 2007 de-
leted the default arbitration provision from the AlA contract but re-
tained mediation as a precondition to going to court.28 As 
arbitration's popularity wanes, mediation is becoming the ADR pro-
cess of choice for both disputes and pre-dispute contracts. 
As mediation becomes a primary forum for dispute settlement, 
legalization of mediation occurs as lawyers over time default to utiliz-
ing litigation skills in informal dispute processes.29 Professor Jacque-
line Nolan-Haley joins a chorus of scholars30 who argue that 
22. Howard J. Aibel, Mediation Works: Opting for Interest-Based Solutions to a 
Range of Business Needs, DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 26 (1996) (stating that compliance with 
agreements is likely to be higher when it is not imposed by a third party). 
23. See Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, infra note 28, at 10-11. 
24. Rhys Clift, Introduction to Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Comparison Be· 
tween Arbitration and Mediation 7-9, 2006, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1647627, 'll'll 4.18--4.22, at 8 (confidentiality), 7-9 (satisfac-
tion), 'li'li 7.13-.14, at 14 (maintaining relationships). 
25. Nolan-Haley, supra note 6, at 71 (citing Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, 2004 U.S. 
Corporate Counsel Litigation Trends Survey Findings, 1 (2004), available at http:// 
www .fulbright.com/mediaroom/files/fj0536-uk -v 13. pdf, indicating more respondents 
reported using mediation than arbitration); see also, Russ Bleemer, CPR Meeting Sur· 
vey Finds Mediation Is Top ADR Choice, 25 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH CosT OF LITI-
GATION (CPR, New York, N.Y.) Jun. 2007, at 110; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract 
and Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 831, 849-51 (2001). 
26. Arbitration and ADR Rules, lNT'L CHAMBER OF CoM. art. 5(2) (2011) (requir-
ing the neutral to act as a mediator in instances where the parties lack agreement to 
use a specific settlement mechanism). 
27. Robert N. Dobbins, The Layered Dispute Resolution Clause: From Boilerplate 
to Business Opportunity, 1 HAsTINGS Bus. L.J. 159, 162-77 (2005) (described by Dob-
bins as "layered" dispute resolution clauses). 
28. AM. INsT. oF ARcHITECTS, AlA DocuMENT A201-2007 GENERAL CoNDITIONS 
OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION art. 15.3.1. 
29. Id. 
30. See Bush, infra note 71, at 122 (describing evaluative mediation's similarity 
to arbitration); Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Vanishing Trial: Land Mine on the Media-
tion Landscape or Opportunity for Evolution: Ruminations on the Future of Mediation 
Practice, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 27, 60--61 (2005) (predicting mediation's 
growing similarity to arbitration due to the vanishing trial phenomenon). Kimberlee 
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mediation is becoming the "New Arbitration" because "legal media-
tion has taken on many of the features traditionally associated with 
arbitration: adversarial posturing by attorneys in the name of zeal-
ous advocacy, adjudication by third party neutrals, and the practice 
of mediator evaluation."31 Professor Robert Baruch Bush argues that 
this evaluative style of mediation is so similar to mediation that it is 
nothing more than "an arbitration substitute."32 
Not all mediation is legal or evaluative. Evaluative, or legalized, 
mediation can be distinguished from facilitative and transformative 
styles of mediation. Evaluation in mediation lacks a singular defini-
tion but operates on a continuum. On one end of the evaluative con-
tinuum, mediators predict court outcomes, provide case analysis with 
assessments of strengths and weaknesses, and recommend specific 
proposals.33 On the other, mediators use questions or statements 
that implicitly suggest to the parties the mediator's opinion.34 Evalu-
ative mediators tend to have more influence over the outcome, with 
the most evaluative directly impacting any settlements reached.35 
Additionally, evaluative mediations tend to more closely resemble a 
court-based process, with a neutral firmly in control of the topics and 
the direction of the conversation. Facilitative mediators, on the other 
hand, refrain from providing their opinions, views, and suggestions 
regarding the issues being discussed. Facilitative mediators work to 
clarify and enhance communication between the parties, and demon-
strate process control. For example, a facilitative mediator decides 
when or if to meet separately with the parties. A third style, in direct 
opposition to both facilitative and evaluative mediation, is transform-
ative mediation. Transformative mediators believe neither facilita-
tive nor evaluative mediation provides for true party empowerment 
and seeks to place parties in direct, sole control over both process and 
outcome. 36 Despite the facilitative and transformative mediation 
K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARv. 
NEGOT. L. REv. 71 (1998) (arguing that arbitration's criticism are applicable to evalu-
ative mediation). 
31. Nolan-Haley, supra note 6, at 61 (describing legal mediation as a mediation 
where lawyers are involved as advocates for parties). 
32. Bush, infra note 71, at 125. 
33. Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
A Closer, Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 211, 224 (2004) 
34. A.B.A. Sec. Disp. Resol. Rep., Task Force on Improving Mediation Quality 
Final Report, 34 (2008). 
35. LEONARD L. RISKIN, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 7 (1996). 
36. See RoBERT A. BARUCH BusH & JoSEPH P. FoLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIA· 
TION (rev. ed. 2004). 
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styles which ensure greater mediator impartiality and party self-de-
termination to parties than evaluative mediation, the legalized ver-
sion of mediation persists where attorneys are involved. 
Lawyers acting as mediators are highly likely to evaluate even if 
they are trained in the facilitative method of mediation. 37 Lawyers 
tend to highly prefer evaluative mediators for their mediations,38 and 
they prepare accordingly for this style ofmediation.39 In order to gain 
advantage with an evaluative mediator, attorneys often appear in-
flexible and present arguments intended to influence the mediator.40 
Through this mediator "spinning," the advocate tries to persuade the 
mediator in the hope of gaining the mediator's support for a settle-
ment that will favor their client.41 Spinning provides the opportunity 
for lawyers to operate as though in private judicial settlement confer-
ences42 and engage in adversarial behavior43 considered unethical in 
arbitration. 
Adversarial behavior by attorneys in mediation is a growing 
problem. A 2010 survey of mediators in the New York region asked 
about their behavior in mediation.44 The survey indicated lawyers 
37. Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litiga-
tion in Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REv. 473, 524 (2002); Kovach & Love, supra note 33, at 
92-93 (noting that lawyers "revert to their default adversarial mode, analyzing the 
legal merits of the case in order to move towards settlement"). 
38. Nancy Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice 
Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 805 (2001). 
39. HAROLD ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION, at 203 (National Institute 
for Trial Advocacy 2010).("If you know in advance that your mediator will evaluate, 
you should develop a plan for securing a favorable evaluation."). 
40. Id. at 203-04. 
41. John T. Blankenship, The Vitality of the Opening Statement in Mediation: A 
Jumping-Off Point To Consider, 9 APPALACHIAN J.L. 165, 178 (2010) (noting that cau-
cus and the separation ofthe parties may make it easier to spin the mediator); Joseph 
P. McMahon Jr., Moving Mediation Back Towards Its Historic Roots- Suggested 
Changes, 37 CoLO. LAW. 23, 23-24 (2008) (arguing that it is easier to manipulate a 
mediator during caucus than in joint session); Joan Steams Johnsen, Mediator-
Friend or Foe? Using Mediator to Your Best Advantage, SF16 A.L.I., A.B.A. Continu-
ing Legal Education 415 (2000) (criticizing spinning as detrimental to mediation). 
42. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in 
Court·Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. 
NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 23, 25-27, 57-58 (2001) (noting mediation's growing adversarialms 
and similarity to judicial settlement conferences); Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthis A. 
Savage, ADR in the Courts: Progress, Problems and Possibilities, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 
327, 335 (2003) (noting that mediation increasingly looks "more like the traditional 
pretrial settlement conference, and less like the altemative process originally in-
tended by its proponents"). 
43. Kovach & Love, supra note 30, at 96 ("[Lawyers] attempt to draw mediation 
back into their adversarial paradigm"). 
44. Nolan-Haley, supra note 6, at 93-94. 
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use adversarial behaviors in mediation, including arguing positions 
and contesting the other side's positions, presenting legal facts and 
arguments to the mediator as though they were a fact finder, or argu-
ing as if participating in a trial.45 Bad faith tactics persist in media-
tion,46 including attorneys that lie,47 mislead, and delay48 to increase 
litigation costs, or claim limited authority to negotiate.49 Attorneys 
also use mediation as an opportunity for free discovery,50 and they 
often intentionally misuse confidential communications as the courts 
sometimes ignore and do not regularly sanction abuses of 
confidentiality.51 
The growth of the use of mediation has primarily been in this 
legalized, evaluative form of the process.52 John Lande predicted this 
pattern in 1997, commenting that "[w]here mediation becomes rou-
tinely integrated into litigation practice, we can expect that this will 
significantly alter both lawyers' practices in legal representation and 
mediators' practices in offering and providing mediation services."53 
Thus it is the increase in legally trained mediators, in addition to the 
increase in advocates within mediation that is responsible for the in-
creasing legalization of mediation. Med-Arb is promoted as a solution 
to arbitration's lack of flexibility and the increasingly legalized ver-
sion of mediation. 
C. The Med-Arb "Solution" 
Med-Arb proponents allege the process resolves mediation and 
arbitration's problems by providing (1) finality, (2) efficiency, and 
45. Id. at 79. 
46. Id. at 81. 
47. See generally Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and 
the Art of Defensive Self-Help, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 481 (2009); Don Peters, 
When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in Mediation and a Modest 
Proposal, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 119 (2007). 
48. Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory 
Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 267 (2002). 
49. See, e.g., Don Peters, Just Say No: Minimizing Limited Authority Negotiating 
in Court-Mandated Mediation, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 273, 273 (2008). 
50. Macfarlane, supra note 48, at 309. 
51. Nolan-Haley, supra note 6, at 82--83 (Citing Sarah Rudolph Cole, Protecting 
Confidentiality in Mediation: A Promise Unfulfilled?, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1419, 
1424-25 (2006) ("The constant misuse of mediation communications seems surprising 
in light of the importance parties, mediators, attorneys, courts, and legislatures place 
on protecting mediation confidentiality.")). 
52. Bush, infra note 71, at 115. 
53. John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each 
Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839, 841 (1997) (describing the impact of mediation's 
integration into litigation practice). 
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(3) flexibility54 for a variety of types of disputes. 55 The Med-Arb "solu-
tion" is to combine arbitration's finality with mediation's flexibility in 
order to gain efficiency and the best of both processes. In reality, the 
problems facing the two processes are not inherent and are being uti-
lized by neutrals seeking to gain by taking advantage of mediation's 
growing popularity. This Section now reviews the Med-Arb's pro-
posed advantages of finality, efficiency, and flexibility. 
Med-Arb is promoted as a process to fix the mediator's lack of 
formal authority to create a final and binding settlement."56 Specifi-
cally, Med-Arb guarantees a binding arbitration award if settlement 
does not occur in mediation.57 Finality also promotes another Med-
Arb advantage: efficiency. Early neutrals argued for arbitrators me-
diating as a first step as parties are more efficient in identifying 
problems and potential solutions when the next step is a binding de-
cision. 58 Med-Arb proponents promote Med-Arb as a corrective strat-
egy to combat procrastination,59 and the adversarial nature of 
legalized mediation60 by placing the decision-maker in the room to 
54. E.g., Kristen M. Blankley, Keeping a Secret from Yourself? Confidentiality 
When Same Neutral Serves Both as Mediator and as Arbitrator in the Same Case, 63 
BAYLOR L. REV. 317, 326 (2011); Thomas J. Brewer & Lawrence R. Mills, Med-Arb: 
Combining Mediation and Arbitration, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 32, 34 (1999); Gerald F. 
Phillips, Same-Neutral Med-Arb: What Does the Future Hold?, 60 DrsP. RESOL. J. 24, 
28-32 (2005). 
55. See, e.g., Pau Caprara, Surfs Up: The Implications of Tort Liability in the 
Unregulated Sport of Surfing, 44 CAL. W. L. REv. 557, 583 (2008) (surfing disputes); 
Candi Henry, Spam v. Ms. Piggy: An Entertainment Law Cautionary Tale, 8 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TEcH. L. 573, 582-84 (2006) (entertainment law disputes); Marcy L. McCul-
lough, Prescribing Arbitration to Cure the Common Crisis: Developing Legislation to 
Facilitate Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigating Medical Malpractice Disputes in 
Pennsylvania, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 809, 833 (2006) (medical malpractice disputes); 
for a more complete list, See Blankley, supra note 54, at 329, fn. 37. 
56. Karen L. Henry, Med-Arb: An Alternative to Interest Arbitration in the Reso· 
lution of Contract Negotiation Disputes, 3 OH. ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 385, 390 (1998) 
57. E.g., Brewer & Mills, supra note 54; Sussman, supra note 1, at 71-73; Mc-
Lean & Wilson, supra note 1, at 30. 
58. C. W. AHNER, Arbitration: A Management Viewpoint, in THE ARBITRATOR AND 
THE PARTIES: PRoc. OF THE ELEVENTH NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 76, 78-82 (Jean McKelvey 
ed., 1958). 
59. JAMES HAYES, Grievance Mediation: Why Some Use It and Others Don't, in 
ARBITRATION 2009: DUE PROCESS IN THE WORKPLACE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-SEC-
OND ANNuAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 224, 230 (Paul D. 
Staudohar ed., 2010). 
60. DEAN G. PRUIT ET AL., Process of Mediation in Dispute Settlement Centers, in 
MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVEN-
TION 368, 389-90 (D. Pruitt & Assoc. K. Kressel ed., 1989) (finding parties made fewer 
hostile comments and proposed more solutions under same-neutal Med-Arb than dif-
ferent-neutral Med-Arb or standard mediation). 
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provide the "stick"61 that guarantees good behavior.62 Specifically, 
Med-Arb proponents argue the finality of arbitration assists the pro-
cess of mediation by providing the incentive to avoid posturing and 
bargain in good faith during mediation.63 Proponents argue efficiency 
is achieved because the legalized, evaluative form of mediation is 
neutralized, leading to faster settlements and cost savings. 64 Fur-
ther, using the same neutral saves time and cost by eliminating the 
need for parties to identify, appoint, and educate an additional neu-
tral.65 Finally, flexibility is promoted as a Med-Arb benefit that will 
improve arbitration. Med-Arb advocates promote the use of a hybrid 
process as a means of infusing arbitration with many of the informal 
benefits of mediation. For example, in mediation parties can have a 
less structured and less formal conversation about the case and pos-
sibilities for resolution. Mediation allows for solutions to underlying 
issues as opposed to arbitration awards only addressing issues for-
mally presented as evidence.66 
The Med-Arb solution provides arbitration with flexibility by ad-
ding mediation and mediation gains finality by adding arbitration 
and placing the decision-maker in the room to provide the "stick"67 
that promotes settlement.68 As a result both processes gain efficiency 
by utilizing each other's natural advantages. However, the Med-Arb 
"solution" is not a solution at all because it relies on a false premise 
that mediation and arbitration as independent processes have inher-
ent problems that need to be corrected. A more likely reason for pro-
moting Med-Arb is that arbitration increasingly resembles litigation, 
and mediation's popularity is a threat to the financial viability of pri-
vate arbitration practice. For example, in a 2013 Strauss Institute 
survey of 200 experienced College of Commercial Arbitrators ("CCA"), 
a majority indicated a higher proportion of their caseloads settled 
both pre-hearing and pre-award during the last five years than before 
61. Hayes, supra note 59. 
62. Phillips, supra note 54, at 30 ("Curiously, I found that parties behave better 
during same-neutral med-arb than in classic mediation. This is probably because they 
do not want to alienate the potential arbitrator."). 
63. Weisman, supra note 1, at 40; Blankenship, supra note 2, at 31; Phillips, 
supra note 54, at 28-29. 
64. Id. 
65. Phillips, supra note 54, at 28. 
66. Barry C. Bartel, Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History, 
Analysis, and Potential, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 661, 665 (1991). 
67. Hayes, supra note 59. 
68. Phillips, supra note 54, at 30 ("I found that parties behave better during 
same-neutral Med-Arb than in classic mediation. This is probably because they do not 
want to alienate the potential arbitrator."). 
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that time.69 To the author's knowledge (and research efforts) there 
are no neutrals who primarily serve as mediators who have publica-
tions advocating for the use of Med-Arb. Instead, Med-Arb is a pro-
cess promoted by arbitrators to maintain and enhance the market 
viability of arbitration by adding a mediation component and selling 
the two processes as one package. 
D. The Med-Arb "Solution" Is Built on a False Premise 
Med-Arb appears to be a creative and effective means of acces-
sing the benefits of both informal and formal dispute mechanisms. In 
reality, the increasing interest in Med-Arb is a result of the legaliza-
tion of ADR and efforts to use arbitration to fix mediation and media-
tion to fix arbitration. Med-Arb is promoted "to cure some of the 
problems inherent in both mediation and arbitration."70 These 
problems are not, however, "inherent" to both processes, and instead 
are due to the legalization and formalization of informal processes. 
For example, mediation does not have an "inherent" problem 
with finality. Finality is only a problem in mediation due to the legal-
ized, evaluative form of mediation. By definition, mediation is a con-
sensual process that is not designed to impose finality. 71 Nor does the 
lack of finality does not impact mediation settlement rates. Studies of 
general civil and divorce mediations in Michigan in 2008 show that 
nearly 70% of all cases sent to mediation immediately resulted in set-
tlement, with a substantial number settling shortly after.72 Surveys 
of these participants indicated that over 90% of mediation partici-
pants were satisfied with mediation, even if the case did not settle at 
mediation.73 Further, a 2001 study of small claims cases in 1999 
showed a voluntary compliance rate of 90% for mediated agreements 
69. Thomas J. Stipanowhich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Commercial Arbitration and 
Settlement: Empirical Insights into the Roles Arbitrators Play, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIA-
TION 1, 16-17 (2014). 
70. Blankenship, supra note 2, at 28 (citing Henry, supra note 56, at 389). 
71. See Robert Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The Grow-
ing Market for Evaluative Mediation, and What It Means for the ADR Field, 3 PEPP. 
DrsP. RESOL. L. J. 111, 115 (2002) (stating that mediation's main draw was its consen-
sual alternative to binding, mandatory processes like arbitration and litigation). 
72. STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN ADR SECTION, LETTING LITIGANTS KNow THAT MEDI-
ATION REALLY WoRKS!, available at http://www.michbar.org/adr/pdfs/guide.pdf. 
73. Id. 
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versus 53% for non-mediated judgments. 74 These rates remain con-
sistent in Georgia, where 69% of all mediated cases resulted in settle-
ment between 2005 and 2008.75 In 2008, the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission's mediation program reported a 72.1% set-
tlement rate. 76 In the family realm, parents mediating custody dis-
putes reached settlement in mediation at a 77% rate. 77 In a 
comprehensive review of mediation studies, Professor Roselle Wissler 
found settlement rates as high as 63%,78 compliance with mediated 
agreements at 90% or greater,79 and highly favorable views of media-
tion among litigants.80 These studies tend to demonstrate media-
tion's effectiveness without finality. Mediation inherently does not 
suffer due to the lack of a guaranteed, final, and binding settlement. 
Instead of resolving the legalization of these processes at their 
root causes, legalization, Med-Arb combines the two processes. Med-
Arb formalizes and provides a mechanism of finality to a form of me-
diation that already looks in practice like non-binding arbitration.81 
In effect, Med-Arb is Arb-Arb, where the first phase is non-binding 
arbitration followed by a binding form of arbitration if no agreement 
is reached. Ironically, the "new arbitration" style of mediation is more 
akin to the form of arbitration that existed before legalization trans-
formed it into a process that closely resembles litigation.82 Legaliza-
tion is mediation's problem. Evaluative mediators and adversarial 
advocates violate the core values of the process. The solution is not to 
provide the mediator with binding settlement authority, which only 
makes it even more impossible to fulfill the core principles central to 
the process. 
In order to actualize mediation's core values of impartiality, self-
determination, and confidentiality, lawyers and law students must be 
trained to effectively advocate in collaborative processes and 
74. Id. 
75. Naman L. J. Wood, Can Judges Increase Mediation Settlement Rates? Of 
"Coase" They Can, 26 OHio ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 683, 691 (2011). 
76. Questions and Answers About Mediation, U.S. EQuAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY 
CoMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/qanda.cfm (last visited May 13, 2015). 
77. Robert E. Emery, Sheila G. Matthews & Melissa M. Wyer, Child Custody 
Mediation and Litigation: Further Evidence on the Differing Views of Mothers and 
Fathers, 59 J. CoNSULTING & CLINICAL PsYCHOL. 410, 412 (1991). 
78. Roselle Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in 
Civil Cases, 22 CoNFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 65 (2004). 
79. Id. at 68. 
80. Id. at 65. 
81. Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of Principled Advocacy in the Development of 
the Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 265, 277 (2002) (stating that some 
forms of evaluative mediation may be similar to non-binding arbitration). 
82. Id. at 122. 
Spring 2015] Med-Arb and the Legalization of ADR 171 
mediators must be trained to facilitate instead of evaluate. 
Mandatory mediation itself needs to be reassessed because it furthers 
the legalization of the process given the dichotomy of mandating par-
ties into a voluntary process.83 With a truly voluntary mediation pro-
cess, fewer instances of "bad faith" or adversarial conduct will take 
place, as no one will be forced to initiate mediation against their will. 
In order to fulfill arbitration's core values of due process and efficient 
justice, arbitrators' must limit extended discovery and advocates 
must create carefully crafted and tailored pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses that will guarantee efficiency. In A 2009 survey of 180 arbi-
trators, corporate counsel and attorneys representing clients in arbi-
tration, 65% identified mismanaged motion practice as moderately 
and very much a reason why arbitration fails to meet business users 
desire for speed, efficiency, and economy.84 Instead of arbitration's 
lack of informality or mediation's lack of finality, both mediation and 
arbitration are impacted by legalization and attorneys' use of both 
processes as alternative forums within which they may litigate. The 
solution is to address the legalization itself. 
The Med-Arb "solution" assumes that the initial problems of in-
formality or lack of finality observed with mediation and arbitration 
are inherent to the processes, and can be resolved by combining 
them. However, legalization of arbitration and mediation cannot be 
fixed by further legalization. As the next Part describes, Med-Arb will 
be unable to "save" either process because harms the central tenants 
of each and will only further the legalization of both mediation and . 
arbitration. 
III. MEn-ARB WILL FuRTHER ADR's LEGALIZATION 
The process of Med-Arb harms the core principles of each proce-
dure and will accelerate the legalization of mediation by limiting in-
formality and accelerating arbitration's legalization by increasing the 
likelihood of judicial review. Though Med-Arb may encourage parties 
to mediate, it limits the core principles of mediation - impartiality, 
self-determination, and confidentiality - and strips mediation of its 
informal character. Med-Arb also places stress on the core principles 
of arbitration - due process, confidentiality, and arbitral neutral-
ity - by making the arbitral award increasingly susceptible to court-
review. 
83. See Thompson, infra note 160, at 422-24. 
84. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 69, at 23. 
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A. Med-Arb Is Detrimental to Candor and Confidentiality 
Med-Arb harms candor and confidentiality and further legalizes 
both mediation and arbitration by making one neutral both mediator 
and arbitrator. Mediation is legalized because putting the decision-
maker in the room formalizes the process and makes candid conver-
sation, crucial to a voluntary process, unlikely. Arbitration is legal-
ized because arbitral awards are exposed to increased judicial review 
through the use of confidential mediation conversations while render-
ing those awards. As a result, Med-Arb severely limits mediation's 
effectiveness while endangering the enforceability of any resulting 
arbitral award by making it more susceptible to judicial review. 
Mediation's confidentiality encourages candor by promoting the 
free expression of needs, interests, and options for resolution.85 Medi-
ation is unique amongst the alternative dispute resolution practices 
because its informality allows parties to speak freely without fear 
that they might be harmed for their candor.86 Mediators rely on free 
information exchange to identify interests, assist in correcting infor-
mation asymmetries, reality-test assumptions, and build trust be-
tween the parties.87 Placing the prospective decision-maker in the 
room as a neutral negatively impacts the candor of the parties in the 
"Med" phase and reduces the effectiveness of the process. When par-
ties know that the mediator may later assume the role of arbitrator, 
both advocates and parties will not be as candid with the mediator 
about weaknesses in their arguments or offer information that may 
be detrimental to their positions. 88 For example, a 2008 survey (de-
scribed subsequently as the "Wissler Survey") asked Ohio lawyers 
about their experiences with mediation and settlement conferences in 
federal court. 89 When the judge assigned to the case oversaw a settle-
ment conference, 71% of lawyers strongly or somewhat disagreed 
with the statement that parties can be candid with the neutral about 
interests and difficulties in the case without concerns of negative con-
sequences.90 Comparatively, lawyers strongly or somewhat disagreed 
85. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The 
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 822-23 (1984) (discussing the 
importance of information exchange for resolving disputes). 
86. See id. 
87. Pappas, supra note 4, at 42. 
88. Brewer & Mills, supra note 54, at 35; Phillips, supra note 54, at 27. 
89. Roselle Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement Procedures: Mediation and Ju-
dicial Settlement Conferences, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DrsP. RESOL. 271. 
90. Id. 
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with the statement that parties can be candid with a judge not as-
signed to the case (26%), court staff mediator (7%), volunteer media-
tor (6%), or private mediator (2%).91 Placing the decision maker in 
the room is detrimental to candor, and parties in same-neutral 
processes will carefully guard their statements in the mediation 
phase. 92 As a result, the information needed to craft lasting, reasona-
ble settlement will not be available as parties begin to adopt, in prac-
tice, a more legalistic and formal process.93 
Med-Arb promoters advance the hybrid process as a way of coun-
tering advocates' adversarial behavior by providing the mediator 
with decision-making authority if settlement does not occur. In real-
ity, Med-Arb only furthers the perceived problems with mediation it 
intends to remedy. First, Med-Arb may increase the use of advocates 
in mediation as advocates are not always present in mediation but 
are typically utilized in arbitration. Second, Med-Arb's attempt to 
limit adversarial behavior of advocates by placing the judge in the 
session will create a more formal environment in which (1) the medi-
ator/arbitrator is the focus of the session; and (2) candor is eliminated 
out of a concern of showing weakness to the prospective decision 
maker. In effect, without candor and confidentiality, the mediation 
stage of a Med-Arb becomes an informal arbitration hearing. This is 
especially problematic for arbitration in avoiding challenges to the 
enforceability of the arbitral award. 
The "biggest and most obvious concern with the same-neutral 
[M]ed-[A]rb procedure" is the use of confidential mediation communi-
cations in determining an arbitration award. 94 The arbitral award's 
enforceability of the arbitral award is open to challenge in Med-Arb 
due to the lack of confidentiality of mediation communications in the 
arbitration phase. In the role of the neutral, the future ''judge" may 
learn information during mediation not normally introduced in arbi-
tration95 such as points of flexibility in demands, potential offers, 
weaknesses, or prejudicial information. 96 
Professor Kristin Blankley97 provides examples of awards va-
cated for confidentiality issues, specifically on the basis of: (1) being 
91. Id. 
92. See Phillips, supra note 54, at 27. 
93. Pappas, supra note 4, at 42. 
94. Blankley, supra note 54, at 332. 
95. Ellen E. Deason, Combinations of Mediation and Arbitration with the Same 
Neutral: A Framework for Judicial Review, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 1, 225 (2013). 
96. Id. 
97. Blankley, supra note 54, at 346-58. 
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explicitly based on mediation communications;98 (2) the simple use of 
Med-Arb not creating an implicit waiver of mediation communica-
tions;99 (3) one party not consenting to the appointed arbitrator who 
earlier mediated another aspect of the case;100 and (4) using media-
tion communications not also introduced in the arbitration as the ba-
sis for an arbitration award.101 Further lawsuits involve claims that 
the arbitrator based the award on ex parte evidence received during 
the mediation. 102 
Professor Ellen Deason provides the context as to why the legal 
challenges to combined process occur. First, there is an inherent con-
flict created when a neutral obtains information while serving as 
both mediator and arbitrator. 103 Second, challenges occur because 
the neutral improperly used information while acting as an arbitra-
tor (including rejected settlement proposals) obtained while mediat-
ing.104 Often the mediator/arbitrator's retainer agreement requires 
information shared during the mediation phase to constitute the ar-
bitral record in lieu of a hearing for the purposes of rendering the 
arbitration award. As a result, the mediation and the arbitral eviden-
tiary hearing are one and the same. This results in claims of adjudi-
cative process violations, including claims that the arbitrator did not 
conduct a hearing and failed to take additional evidence.105 
98. Bowden v. Weickert, No. S-02-017, 2003 WL 29419175, (Ohio Ct. App. June 
20, 2003). 
99. Town of Clinton v. Geological Servs. Corp., No. 04-0462A 2006 WL 3246464, 
(Mass. Super. Nov. 8, 2006). 
100. In re Cartwright, 104 S.W.3d at 708. 
101. Twp. of Aberdeen v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n Local 163, 669 A.2d 291, 
94, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
102. ld. (citing U.S. Steel Mining Co., LLC v. Wilson Downhole Servs., No. 
02:00CV1758, 2006 WL 2869535, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2006) (confirming award 
where parties agreed arbitrator could utilize ex parte evidence from mediation); Es-
tate of McDonald, No. BP072816, 2007 WL 259872, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2007) 
(rejecting challenge to binding mediation decision over objection that neutral consid-
ered ex parte communications); Rodriguez v. Harding, No. 04-0200093CV, 2002 WL 
31863766, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2002) (rejecting challenge to Med-Arb award of 
incorrect pre-arbitration ex parte communications with parties). 
103. DEASON, supra note 96, at 229 (citing In re Cartwright, 104 S. W. 3d 706, 710 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (vacating the appointment of the same individual to arbitrate 
property issues in a divorce proceeding who had previously mediated child custody 
issues); Gaskin v. Gaskin, No. 2-06-039-CV, 2006 WL 2507319, at *2-3 (Tex. Ct. App. 
Sept. 21, 2006) (highlighting neutral conflicts resolveable with party consent); Isaac-
son v. Isaacson, 792 A.2d 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001), (finding a categorical prohibition 
on the dual role of mediator and fact-finding guardian ad litem). 
104. ld. at 20. 
105. DEASON, supra note 95, at 240 (citing Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc., 
142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (enforcing a binding mediation award 
even without an arbitral hearing); Wright v. Brockett, 571 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. 
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These challenges occur despite the fact that both processes con-
template and address issues of candor and confidentiality in order to 
avoid judicial involvement in ostensibly private dispute resolution 
processes. Mediation and arbitration separately prohibit breaches of 
confidentiality that routinely occur during Med-Arb. Arbitration's 
right of equal treatment prevents an arbitrator from caucusing sepa-
rately with the parties. 106 Ethical codes for arbitrators, including the 
ABA and Arbitration Association ("AAA") Code of Ethics for Commer-
cial Arbitrators and the International Bar Association ("IBA") Rules 
of Ethics for International Arbitrators, discourage ex parte communi-
cations with parties.107 Because parties cannot rebut arguments they 
were not aware of, i.e. those made by the other side during a confi-
dential mediation caucus, mediation's core principle of confidentiality 
is in direct conflict with a fundamental tenet of arbitration and due 
process: the ability to know of and confront the other side's argu-
ments. Without knowing what was said in the other side's caucus, it 
is impossible to provide countering evidence or cross-examine wit-
nesses about the information. Additionally, the IBA rules state that 
while an arbitrator may make settlement proposals with the parties' 
consent, he must inform the parties that discussing settlement terms 
in the absence of a party will normally lead to disqualification of the 
arbitrator.108 
Mediation's confidentiality rules prevent an adjudicator from 
learning of, and thus being influenced by, mediation communications. 
For example, the Uniform mediation Act restricts the admissibility of 
mediation communications in both court and arbitration proceed-
ings.109 Mediation communications are confidential, with exceptions 
for abuse, neglect, or criminal activity. Most importantly, mediation 
Ct. 1991) (finding that arbitrator violated the statute in refusing to hear evidence or 
conduct an arbitration hearing). 
106. Berger, infra note 151, at 392. 
107. MoDEL CoDE OF ETHICS FOR CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS Canon 3 (Rev. 2004), 
available at www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@arbtors/docu 
ments/arbmed/p123778.pdf (prohibiting discussions of proceedings without all parties 
present; requiring all parties be sent written communications); IBA RULES OF ETHICS 
FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS R. 5.3 (1964) (requiring arbitrators to avoid unilat-
eral communications with any party and to inform the other party about the sub-
stance of the communication if they occur). 
108. IBA RuLES OF ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS R. 8 (1986). 
109. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, Uniform Medi-
ation Act (Aug. 2001) § 2(7)(A) (A proceeding is defined as "a judicial, administrative 
arbitral, or other adjudicative process, including related pre-hearing and post-hearing 
motions, conferences, and discovery."). 
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communications are not subject to disclosure in any formal proceed-
ing as the UMA prohibits the mediator from making a report about 
the mediation to the deciding judge or arbitrator_l1° The UMA fur-
ther requires that decision-makers obtaining information about me-
diation communications may not consider it in making arbitral 
awards.l11 Foreign arbitration statutes echo this general prohibition 
against the admission of mediation communications in an arbitra-
tion.112 Confidentiality statutes do not make exceptions for arbitra-
tion113 and courts examining mediation confidentiality in combined 
processes uniformly find confidentiality rules apply. 114 Rules gov-
erning mediation and arbitration advocate for sharply drawn lines in 
order to protect the confidentiality and thus the sanctity of the two 
processes. 
Med-Arb eliminates the confidentiality between facilitators and 
decision-makers intended to protect the integrity of both 
processes. 115 Med-Arbs structure communication so that the judge, 
and not just the mediator, participates with the parties- indeed, the 
judge and mediator are one and the same. This is as if a judge were to 
110. Uniform Mediation Act, infra note 109, § 7 (stating "[p]rohibited Mediator Re-
ports (a) Except as required in subsection (b), a mediator may not make a report, 
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding 
a mediation to a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may make a 
ruling on the dispute that is the subject of the mediation. (b) A mediator may disclose: 
(1) whether the mediation occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was 
reached, and attendance; (2) a mediation communication as permitted under Section 
6 [providing for exceptions to the privilege]; or (3) a mediation communication evi-
dencing abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation of an individual to a public 
agency responsible for protecting individuals against such mistreatment. (c) A com-
munication made in violation of subsection (a) may not be considered by a court, ad-
ministrative agency, or arbitrator."). 
111. Id. at § 7(C). 
112. Deason, supra note 95, at 227 n.47 (listing multiple international arbitration 
statutes, including Belarus International Arbitration Court Law art. 18 (1990)); Ber-
muda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act § 10 (1993), available at http:// 
www.ciarb.bm/arbitration-act-1993/; Costa Rica Law on Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion of Disputes and Promotion of Freedom from Social Unrest art. 14 (2000); Croatia 
Law on Conciliation art. 13 (2003), in INT'L liANDBOOK ON CoMM. ARB. SuPP. 57, Croa-
tia, Annex II, available at http://alanuzelac.from.hr/pubs/B27_ICCA%20HB%20 
Suppl.%2057%200ffprint%20Croatia.pdf; India Arbitration and Conciliation Act§ 81 
(1996), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/dod13061641; Uganda Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act§ 66 (2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/enltext.jsp? 
file_id170036. 
113. Blankley, supra note 54, at 342-46 (describing multiple states with media-
tion rules that broadly apply to Med-Arb). 
114. DEASON, supra note 95, at 238 n.l11. 
115. Cynthia F. Cohen & Murray E. Cohen, Relative Satisfaction with ADR: Some 
Empirical Evidence, 57 DrsP. RESOL. J. 37, 40 (2002). 
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oversee a settlement conference for their own case. Research indi-
cates many judges in that exact situation lack understanding or con-
cern for confidentiality. In a 2009 survey, only 54% of settlement 
conference judges in general civil cases reported discussing confiden-
tiality of settlement discussions with the participants usually, often, 
or regularly.l16 
Med-Arb inhibits candor in mediation, severely limiting the pro-
cess' effectiveness. Med-Arb eliminates the confidentiality of media-
tion communications in arbitration, unnecessarily exposing any 
resulting arbitral awards to judicial review. Med-Arb proponents ad-
vance four solutions to the confidentiality problems raised by Med-
Arb. First, prior to utilizing Med-Arb parties consent to the structure, 
the resulting confidentiality issues, and waive any resulting causes of 
action. As described in Part III, informed consent is difficult to 
achieve and does not adequately resolve the confidentiality, imparti-
ality, and self-determination issues. By utilizing a complex contract 
involving waivers of liability, informed consent to Med-Arb in itself 
further formalizes the process. 
Second, the confidentiality issue can be lessened, but not com-
pletely resolved, by the mediation all occurring in joint session with-
out separate, private, caucuses. This does not lessen the candor 
concern but it does ensure that parties are able to know of, and thus 
confront, any statements made privately to the mediator. This solu-
tion is largely not viable as most neutrals able to serve as an arbitra-
tor are unaccustomed to facilitating conversation between parties 
and rely largely on caucus. 
A third solution to Med-Arb's confidentiality problem is the neu-
tral disregarding information learned during mediation when deter-
mining the arbitral award. 117 Judges and juries regularly ignore 
information deemed to be improper,118 and the "concept that a trier of 
fact can ignore improper evidence enjoys broad acceptance in Ameri-
can Jurisprudence."119 However, any claim that neutrals may be able 
"to keep secrets from themselves" should be regarded with suspi-
cion.120 The weight of psychological evidence suggests people have 
116. Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge -Legal Lion or Problem Solv-
ing Lamb: An Empirical Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conference Practices 
and Techniques, 33 AM. J. TRIAL Arwoc. 113, 139 (2009) (Usually in the survey was 
defined as greater than 90% of the time, Often as 61-90% of the time, and Regularly 
as 41-60% of the time). 
117. Weisman, supra note 1, at 41. 
118. Blankenship, supra note 2, at 35. 
119. Id. at 36. 
120. Blankley, supra note 54, at 366-67. 
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great difficulty deliberately disregarding information.121 Evidence in-
dicates judges do not disregard inadmissible information when mak-
ing substantive decisions122 and even if a judge can ignore 
information, what was learned will still affect judgments indi-
rectly.123 Furthermore, judges are less able to ignore inadmissible ev-
idence when making determinations that they consider at low risk of 
review.124 Consequently, arbitrators facing little risk of review are 
probably even less able not to consider mediation communications 
during the arbitration phase.12s 
A fourth solution and an alternative to ignoring information 
learned in mediation, Med-Arb proponents suggest reversing the two 
processes. In Arb-Med, the neutral mediating the case renders and 
seals the arbitral award and can be confident that information 
learned in mediation will not contaminate the arbitration process. 126 
Arb-Med may relieve Med-Arb's confidentiality problem, but, as dis-
cussed in the next Section, it does not resolve Med-Arb's impartiality 
problem. 
B. Med-Arb Compromises the Neutral's Impartiality 
Med-Arb's confidentiality and candor problems lead to three ma-
jor impartiality problems. First, acting as a mediator/arbitrator in 
Med-Arb harms the mediator's impartiality by making it more diffi-
cult for the neutral to mediate. Second, acting as the mediator harms 
the arbitrator's impartiality as information learned during the medi-
ation may negatively implicate the neutral's impartiality in render-
ing the arbitral award. The third impartiality problem is created 
when parties attempt to avoid these problems, because the structure 
incentivizes the neutral to pressure settlement prior to arbitration. 
The resulting Med is more formal and more akin to a judicial settle-
ment conference and the resulting Arb is more susceptible to judicial 
review. The 2008 Wissler Survey of Ohio lawyers illustrate the im-
partiality problem: 31% strongly or somewhat agreed with the state-
ment that the judge assigned to the case handling the settlement 
conference is biased, falling to 7% for judges not assigned to the case, 
4% for court staff mediators, 6% for volunteer mediators, and 7% for 
121. Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The 
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L.REv. 1251, 1323 (2005). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1269-70. 
124. Id. at 1324. 
125. Pappas, supra note 4, at 42. 
126. Richard Fullerton, Med-Arb and Its Variants: Ethical Issues for Parties and 
Neutrals, 65 DISP. RESOL. J. 52, 59 (2010). 
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private mediators_ 127 With this in mind, the following Section de-
scribes how Med-Arb's effort to counter the legalization of mediation 
and arbitration actually does the opposite as it exacerbates the im-
partiality problem. 
1. Impartiality of Med-Arbiter Acting as a Mediator 
In Med-Arb, the neutral is incentivized to impose solutions and 
essentially turn the mediation into a faux judicial settlement confer-
ence. This is because the neutral wields significant influence over 
possible alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The parties will 
closely examine the mediator's statements as the mediator may even-
tually become the arbitrator and thus informally controls the Best 
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement ("BATNA").128 In 'normal' me-
diation, parties examine and analyze their BATNAs, often as the me-
diator elucidates and assists the parties in thinking through likely 
outcomes. Med-Arb changes the BATNA analysis of the parties who 
seek to determine from the neutral's clues, what the likely award 
might occur if the matter proceeds to arbitration. The mediation 
turns away from the issues and the parties' options and focuses on 
the neutral. For example, because the same neutral will hear the dis-
pute in arbitration if mediation is unsuccessful, the frequent BATNA 
question of "what might happen if this dispute goes to court?" be-
comes an exercise without a purpose. It is no longer relevant how "a" 
judge may see the evidence, but instead how "the" very mediator ask-
ing the question will decide the matter.129 In Med-Arb, the mediation 
is formalized into a judicial settlement conference as the mediator 
will become the arbitrator if settlement does not occur. 
The neutral's impartiality is also under pressure in the media-
tion phase because the parties have an opportunity to both influence 
the prospective award and to determine what that award might be, 
and to test whether settlement is preferred.13° The parties and their 
advocates will utilize the private caucus sessions to convince the neu-
tral of their case, attempting to "spin" the mediator. At the same time 
the parties will naturally examine any clues as to the neutral's pref-
erences. Impaired perceived and actual impartiality of the neutral 
negatively impacts candor in the mediation because no thoughtful 
mediation participant would share the weaknesses in their case with 
a mediator who may become an arbitrator. 
127. Wissler, supra note 89, at 287. 
128. Pappas, supra note 4, at 43. 
129. Id. 
130. See id. 
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2. Impartiality of the Med-Arbiter Acting as an Arbitrator 
The second impartiality issue occurs after the mediation phase 
when information learned during the mediation phase not normally 
introduced in arbitration, will likely "cast doubt on the judge's deci-
sion-making neutrality."131 The suspicion of parties involved is that 
arbitrators may make biased awards based on information learned 
during the mediation phase alone.132 For example, mediators tend to 
learn the potential settlement ranges. While the arbitrator is charged 
with determining the arbitral award according to the evidence133, all 
parties know that the arbitrator is aware of the boundaries of desired 
settlement. Even if the arbitrator is acting impartially in determin-
ing the award, it will not appear this way to at least one of the parties 
because the parties will assume the neutral came to their conclusion 
with the known settlement ranges in mind. These issues are illus-
trated in the 2008 Wissler Survey of Ohio lawyers, where 60% 
strongly or somewhat disagreed with the statement that the judge 
assigned to the case is "able to explore settlement without prejudice 
to ongoing litigation if the case is not settled."134 In comparison, law-
yers strongly or somewhat disagreed with the same statement relat-
ing to judges not assigned to the case (16%), court staff mediators 
(5%), volunteer mediators (3%), or private mediators (1 %).135 Despite 
fulfilling the obligations of the role, judges no longer appeared "im-
partial," even though the parties consented to the process. The survey 
provides evidence that neutrals with subsequent settlement author-
ity will be widely viewed as partial as compared to neutrals without 
such authority. 
C. Impartiality of the Med-Arbiter Generally 
Med-Arb's third impartiality problem is that it incentivizes the 
neutral to avoid the above arbitral impartiality issue by achieving a 
131. Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Fool· 
ish Consistency or Crucial Predictability, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 79, 83 (2001). 
132. Bartel, supra note 66, at 686. 
133. James M. Gaitis, et.al., CoLLEGE OF CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS GuiDE TO 
BEST PRACTICES IN CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 238 (JurisNet LLC 2014) ("Reasoned 
awards should contain a concise analysis of the critical evidence and applicable law 
and a discussion of how the arbitrators' view of the evidence and law relates to the 
arbitrators' decision"); see also, ARBITRATION FoRUMS, INc., GuiDE FOR ARBITRATORS 4 
(Arbitration Forums, Inc. 2013), https://www.arbfile.org/af-static/res/Arbitrator 
Resources/arbitrator_guide.pdf("All decisions must be based solely on the arguments 
made in the contentions and the evidence submitted by the parties to avoid any per-
ception of bias"). 
134. Wissler, supra note 127, at 284. 
135. Id. 
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mediated resolution. Neutrals pressuring settlement compromise 
their impartiality by abusing the "shadow" of an impending arbitra-
tion to put pressure on settlement. The self-determination issues cre-
ated by such tactics are reviewed in Part III. Med-Arb's structure is 
similar to a judicial settlement conference, and research indicates 
that settlement conference judges are partial towards settlement. For 
example, only 25% of general civil settlement conference judges sur-
veyed in 2009 reported usually, often, or regularly being indifferent 
as to whether a settlement is accomplished.l36 No judges in settle-
ment conferences for complex civil cases reported usually, often, or 
regularly being indifferent as to whether settlement is accom-
plished.137 Neutrals in a Med-Arb are similar to judges in a settle-
ment conference, only the Med-Arb structure incentivizes the neutral 
to pressure settlement, and in doing so, harms the neutral's 
impartiality. 
Not every party knows whether they want to settle when they 
enter the process. Consequently, neutrals pressuring settlement are 
not impartial and in effect become someone with whom the parties 
must negotiate in order to achieve their goals. For example, if a party 
shares their 'true' bottom line with the mediator, they will likely be 
pressured towards it, incentivizing the party to hide information. In 
reality, parties need help thinking through their options and without 
complete information the neutral is less likely to be able to assist. 
This is not a phenomenon created by Med-Arb, but is a result of the 
legalized form of mediation in which settlement is assumed and the 
mediator is there to evaluate, pressure, and cajole. Med-Arb further 
legalizes the situation by incentivizing the neutral to avoid confiden-
tiality and impartiality issues in the arbitration by using their deci-
sion-making authority to pressure settlement in the mediation phase. 
D. A Med-Arb Is Not a Judicial Settlement Conference 
Med-Arb proponents make three main arguments to rebut the 
impartiality problem. First, advocates argue that a process of in-
formed consent, often accompanied by a waiver of liability for any 
perceived or actual partiality, resolves the issue. Second, advocates 
argue there is no conflict in using the same neutral for both the Med 
and the Arb because this blended process is analogous to a judicial 
settlement conference. Finally, advocates point to Arb-Med as a 
136. Robinson, supra note 116 at 143 (Usually in the survey was defmed as 
greater than 90% of the time, Often as 61-90% of the time, and Regularly as 41-60% 
of the time). 
137. Id. 
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means of resolving impartiality concerns. Informed consent is further 
discussed in Part Ill. e. The remainder of this Part describes the sec-
ond and third arguments. 
1. Judicial Settlement Conferences Face Impartiality Issues 
Med-Arb proponents point to ostensibly 'impartial' judges in civil 
cases routinely acting as mediators in settlement conferences. If set-
tlement does not occur, the case continues into the trial or "arbitra-
tion" phase. Bolstering this argument, Peter Robinson's research 
found 80% of the techniques used by a judge in a "mediation" are the 
same as those used by a judge in a "settlement conference."138 Recent 
studies indicate that judicial settlement conferences are very similar 
to evaluative mediations, and that both face impartiality problems. A 
2009 survey of settlement conferences judges indicated 75% of civil 
judges in general and complex cases request concessions from one or 
both parties in negotiation usually, often, or regularly.l39 Sixty per-
cent of civil judges in general and complex cases indicated they meet 
exclusively in caucus usually, often, or regularly.l40 Only 11% of 
judges in general and complex cases encouraged the clients to discuss 
the case directly with the other side usually, often or regularly.l41 
These statistics demonstrate that judicial settlement conferences and 
evaluative mediation are today one and the same. The impartiality 
issues facing Med-Arb, including ex parte communications and the 
propriety of pressuring settlement, exist in judicial settlement confer-
ences. The argument that Med-Arb's impartiality is satisfied because 
the hybrid simply replicates a judicial settlement conference instead 
proves the point: A judicial settlement conference is not an impartial-
ity model for Med-Arb to replicate. 
Research from the early 1980s bolsters this conclusion and dem-
onstrates the discomfort expressed by both lawyers and judges re-
garding judicial settlement techniques viewed as biased. Lawyers 
surveyed on judicial settlement by Wall and Schiller in 1982 found 
the most used techniques included: Asking both lawyers to compro-
mise (80%), analyzing the case for a lawyer (79%), suggesting they 
split the difference (72%), pressuring the ill-prepared attorney (72%), 
evaluating one or both cases for the attorneys (69%), calling a certain 
138. PETER ROBINSON, Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate About Judges At· 
tempting to Settle Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 335, 375 
(2006). 
139. Robinson, supra note 136 at 119. 
140. Id. at 134. 
141. Id. at 136. 
Spring 2015] Med-Arb and the Legalization of ADR 183 
figure reasonable (69%), suggesting settlement figures after asking 
for lawyers' inputs (67%), and informing the attorneys as to how simi-
lar cases have been settled (66%).142 Lawyers viewed (1) coercing 
lawyers to settle (2) suggesting settlement figures without asking for 
lawyers' inputs, (3) pointing out the case's strengths and weaknesses 
to the client ( 4) commenting on the credibility of testimony; and 
(5) offering advice to a lawyer to be unethical practices.l43 Lawyers 
viewed judicial settlement techniques to be lacking impartiality and 
biased towards settlement. 
Judges themselves raised concerns about conducting judicial set-
tlement conferences in a 1984 survey by Wall, Schiller, and Ebert.l44 
Reasons against participating in settlement conferences highlighted 
the impartiality concerns and included opinions that it was ethically 
improper, outside their role, represented illegal and impeachable of-
fenses, or that they themselves resented judicial pressure when prac-
ticing as attorneys.145 A significant number of judges also declined to 
become involved in settlement negotiations because they felt it 
prejudiced them if the negotiations were unsuccessful. 146 Others felt 
that judicial-led settlement resulted in parties' routinely expecting 
such involvement and thus doing very little settlement work prior to 
court involvement. 147 Early evidence suggests both attorneys and 
judges were uncomfortable with impartiality issues raised by judicial 
settlement conferences. There are impartiality issues with settlement 
conferences as judges serving as "informal mediators" are more pow-
erful than either of the parties compared to other neutrals.148 By us-
ing the specter of an unfavorable judgment as a sword, a judge can 
yield significant power in shaping specific settlements. There are also 
impartiality issues with using judicial settlement conferences as a 
model for Med-Arb to emulate. 
142. James A. Wall & Lawrence F. Schiller, Judicial Involvement in Pre-Trial Set-
tlement: A Judge Is Not a Bump on a Log, 6 AM. J. TRrAL Anvoc. 27, 43 (table 2) 
(1982). 
143. Id. at 44 (table 3). 
144. James A. Wall, et al., Should Judges Grease the Slow Wheel of Justice? A 
Survey on the Effectiveness of Judicial Mediary Techniques, 8, 83 (1984). 
145. Id. at 110-11. 
146. Id. at 111. 
147. Id. 
148. James A. Wall & Dale E. Rude, The Judge as a Mediator, 76 J. OF APPL. 
PsYCHOL. 54, 54-59 (1991). 
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2. Elevating Med-Arbiters to Judge-like Status Exacerbates the 
Impartiality Problem and Creates a Due Process 
Problem 
Following mediation with arbitration and using the same neutral 
for both processes elevates the neutral to judge-like status. Just as 
parties and their advocates carefully watch judges during settlement 
conference for signs of signaling preferences or views about the case, 
the parties in a Med-Arb do the same, elevating the already sensitive 
issue of impartiality. Due to the similarity between evaluative media-
tion and judicial settlement conferences, Med-Arb should not be con-
sidered a hybrid of mediation and arbitration, but instead a judicial 
settlement conference conducted prior to an arbitration. There is one 
notable difference that constitutes a key reason why the judicial set-
tlement conference analogy fails: The arbitration in a Med-Arb lacks 
the due process protections provided by either trial or a traditional 
arbitration. The fact that many judges are involved in settlement dis-
cussions prior to litigation does not mean it is proper for a neutral to 
do so under private dispute resolution procedures. For example, often 
the neutral seeks to use the mediation as the arbitral hearing if the 
mediation ends in impasse instead of conducting two distinct sessions 
and an opportunity for presenting proofs. This makes it impossible 
for an appeal given the unavailability of an evidentiary record, and 
presents issues in terms of the right to confront all arguments. 
Clearly defined procedures governing litigation protect the parties 
from the dangers of partial settlement conference judges. Med-Arb 
lacks due process protections. 
Blending mediation and arbitration without a clear delineation 
raises process concerns, including the arbitrator asking a party in ar-
bitration what it would offer and entering this amount as an 
award. 149 Problematic transitions from mediation to arbitration can 
also occur, notably when parties reach an incomplete agreement in 
mediation and are unclear as to the extent to which process is under-
way.150 The result is a Med-Arb hybrid process vulnerable to legal 
review- endangering the enforceability, and thus the finality, of the 
arbitral award. 
149. Id. at 241 (citing Trimble v. Graves, 947 N.E.2d 885, 889 (Ill. Ct. App. 2011) 
(vacating award and labeling the inquiry as acceptable in mediation but no arbitra-
tion. The evidence was prejudicial and presented an impermissible delegation of the 
arbitrators' duty to adjudicate.). 
150. ld. (citing Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 265, 267--68 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998) (refusing to enforce binding mediation award arising out of a lack of con-
sensus by the parties and the mediator about whether it was binding). 
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The settlement conference comparison also fails to satisfy impar-
tiality due to the rules governing arbitration and mediation. Arbitra-
tion requires an opportunity for parties to be heard and to be treated 
equally. 151 Equal treatment is significantly conditioned on a neutral's 
impartiality. The Texas Ethical Guidelines for Mediators provides 
that a neutral serving as a mediator should not subsequently serve in 
any other judicial or quasi-judicial capacity in matters that are the 
subject of the mediation.l52 The Ontario Arbitration Act prohibits 
any process that "might compromise or appear to compromise the ar-
bitral tribunal's ability to decide the dispute impartially."153 The 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration ("CIETAC") 
rules were changed to accommodate western concerns and now en-
able parties to have their conciliation conducted by person(s) other 
than the arbitration tribunal.154 Existing ethical rules operate to cre-
ate distinctions between formal and informal processes in order to 
ensure confidentiality, candor, and impartiality. 
3. Research Indicates a Preference for Separating the Informal 
and Formal Resolution Functions 
Studies indicate a clear preference for separating the informal 
and formal resolution functions. A 2009 Wissler Survey of Ohio law-
yers examining mediation versus settlement conferences, indicates 
lower satisfaction with settlement conferences overseen by judges as-
signed to the case. Ohio lawyers preferred mediation with staff 
mediators first, followed by settlement conferences with judges not 
assigned to the case, and then mediation with private mediators 
151. Deason, supra note 95, at 226; Klaus Peter Berger, Intergration of Mediation 
Elements into Arbitration: "Hybrid" Procedures and "Intuitive" Mediation by Interna-
tional Arbitrators, 19 ARB. INT'L 387, 391 (2003); Michael Collins, Do International 
Arbitral Tribunals Have any Obligation to Encourage Settlement of the Disputes 
Before Them?, 19 ARB. INT'L 333, 334 (2003); UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/enluncitral_texts/ arbitration/ 
1985Model_Arbitration_status.html (explaining that "[t]he parties shall be treated 
with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case"). 
152. Approval of Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, Misc. Docket No. 05-9107 (Tex_ 
Ct. App. June 13, 2005), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/Mis-
cDocket /05/05910700.pdf; see also Supreme Court Approves Ethical Guidelines for 
Mediators, 68 TEx. B.J. 856, 857-58 (2005). 
153. Ontario Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1991, P 35 (Can.), available at http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.calhtmllstatutes/englishl elaws_statutes_91a17 _e.htm#BK42. 
154. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, China Int'l Econ & Trade Arbitration Comm'n 
(May 1, 2012), available at http://www.cietac.org/index.cms; EDNA SussMAN, Interna-
tional Mediation, 47 INT'L LAw. 179, 181 (2013). 
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ahead of settlement conferences with judges assigned to the case.155 
Only mediation with volunteer mediators was ranked lower.156 
Recent research also indicates clients are better served by court 
mediators, private mediators, and even judges who are not assigned 
to the case than they are by judges assigned by the case. When asked 
about client satisfaction regardless of outcome, 53% oflawyers agreed 
or strongly agreed with the statement that judges assigned to the 
case who overseeing settlement discussions left clients feeling well 
served.157 Only volunteer mediators received a lower rating (33%) 
with non-assigned judges (60%), court mediators (70%) and private 
mediators (59%) all viewed as better able to help clients feel better 
served.158 Separating the informal and formal aspects of resolution 
help to ensure the neutral's impartiality. 
4. Arb-Med Does Not Resolve Med-Arb's Impartiality Problem 
Finally, Med-Arb advocates advance the use of Arb-Med to rebut 
the impartiality problem. Arb-Med may lessen the candor and confi-
dentiality concerns, but it does not address the impartiality problem. 
In Arb-Med, the neutral first conducts the arbitration, seals the 
award, and then mediates the dispute. The parties will still carefully 
watch the neutral's subsequent statements in order to glean informa-
tion about the award. This makes it very difficult for the mediator in 
an Arb-Med to reality test the BATNA and to avoid signaling their 
views. Not only do the arguments advanced by Med-Arb proponents 
correct Med-Arb's impartiality problem, they do not address Med-
Arb's fundamental flaw: The impartiality issue encourages adver-
sarial behavior. The next Section addresses adversarial behavior in 
mediation. 
E. Med-Arb Incentivizes Adversarial Behavior 
The Med-Arb "solution" is to correct the adversarial behavior 
that typifies legalized mediation by placing the "judge" in the room. 
Med-Arb is an effort to deal with parties who refuse to bargain in 
good faith in mediation. The pro-good faith argument is that courts 
compelling mediation have a responsibility to protect parties from ad-
versarial abuse and to provide guidance about what is expected from 
the parties and the mediators. 159 While not uniformly definable, good 
155. Wissler, supra 89, at 298. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 296. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 366. 
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faith is described as "leaving behind adversarial instincts and tactics 
and cooperating, or at least playing along, with the demands of the 
mediator."160 Arguments against good faith include the inability to 
define or the subjective nature of good faith; 161 the creation of addi-
tional litigation over mediation misconduct;162 and the impact on 
confidentiality and mediator impartiality by pressuring good faith be-
havior and being the best evidence of party misconduct. 163 On one 
hand is "distaste for the rule-based adversary system" and preference 
for limiting judicial review to objective issues (e.g., party attendance) 
to minimize the court's role. 164 On the other is the argument that a 
good faith requirement is necessary in order to ensure a fair process 
without adversarial abuse. 165 Therefore tension exists between ef-
forts to maintain confidential, informal, and voluntary alternatives, 
and mandatory means of requiring mediation to ensure efficient and 
effective resolution of disputes. 
Med-Arb proponents argue the hybrid process resolves this ten-
sion and effectively eliminates the need for the mediator to ensure or 
monitor "good faith" in mediation, as he or she will assume the role of 
arbitrator and have decision-control if the dispute does not settle in 
mediation. The finality of the Med-Arb process provides an incentive 
to bargain with the purpose ofreaching an agreement.l66 Negotiating 
in good faith is ensured in Med-Arb by placing the decision-maker in 
the room as the mediator and subsequent arbitrator, and guards 
against adversarial abuses. 167 
Recent research questions whether Med-Arb is the best means of 
managing difficult parties and indicate that there is little difference 
160. Peter N. Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts, 26 OHio ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 363 (2011). 
161. Id. at 374. 
162. David S. Winston, Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes: 
"You Can Lead a Horse to Water ... ", 11 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 187, 198 (1996) 
(noting that this can lead to "exhaustive investigations" that run counter to the inter-
est of efficiency). 
163. Alexandria Zylstra, The Road from Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory Good 
Faith Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled, 17 AM. AcAD. MATRIM. LAW. 69, 
94-97 (2001); James J. Alfini and Catherine G. McGabe, Mediation in the Shadow of 
the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REv. 171, 182-95 (2001) 
164. Thompson, supra note 160, at 376. 
165. Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: 
Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and 
Confidentiality, 76 IND. L. J. 591, 643 (2001) (arguing that good faith mediation re-
quirements are necessary in order to achieve mediation's efficienty, effectiveness, 
party satisfaction, and fairness objectives). 
166. See supra notes 58-B7 and accompanying text. 
167. Id. 
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between mediators and judges in ensuring good behavior. The 2008 
Wissler Survey of Ohio lawyers examining judicial settlement confer-
ences indicated that 76% strongly or somewhat agreed with the state-
ment that when overseeing judicial settlement conferences the judge 
assigned to case can help counsel manage difficult parties.l68 Law-
yers strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement relating to 
judges not assigned to the case (76%), court staff mediators (70%), 
volunteer mediators (36%), and private mediators (62%).169 Examin-
ing the other end of the spectrum, Lawyers strongly or somewhat dis-
agreed with the statement for judges assigned (9%), for judges not 
assigned (5%), for Court staff mediators (7%), for volunteer mediators 
(26%), and for private mediators (5%),17° Aside from the views re-
garding volunteer mediators, these statistics do not indicate a large 
divide between judges and mediators in their ability to help counsel 
manage difficult parties. 
Instead of ensuring good behavior, adding arbitration and the fi-
nality it provides to ensure "good faith" in mediation only legalizes 
the process. In Pruitt, et al.'s 1989 study examining mediation, differ-
ent-neutral Med-Arb, and same-neutral Med-Arb, the authors found 
that threats and strong advocacy of a solution, described as heavy 
pressure tactics, were significantly greater in same-neutral Med-Arb 
than in mediation.l71 Knowing the neutral has decision-making au-
thority, advocates will seek to both determine and influence the views 
of the neutral who will eventually become the decision-maker. 172 
With impartiality under a microscope and candor inhibited as the 
parties attempt to "spin" the mediator, the prospects of reaching 
agreement are severely curtailed. 
Confidential mediation caucus sessions provide Med-Arb parties 
to have ex parte conversations with their future arbitrator - an ideal 
opportunity for advocates to poison the well. 173 Advocates may utilize 
these separate caucus sessions to reveal unfavorable information 
about the other side, knowing that the other side will not know of 
these communications and be able to rebut them. The potential exists 
168. Wissler, supra note 89 at 295. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Pruitt, infra note 189, at 372-74. 
172. Stipanowich & Kaskell, infra note 233, at 21-22 (describing parties' perform-
ance as an attempt to influence the mediator's decision as arbitrator). 
173. Jeff Kichaven, Med-Arb Should Be Dead, N.Y. DISP. RESOL. 80 2009. 
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for advocates to use the mediation, and the caucus sessions in partic-
ular, offensively in anticipation of arbitration. Utilizing this informa-
tion either during the mediation to pressure settlement or afterwards 
while determining the arbitral award harms the mediator's imparti-
ality. Neutral accustomed to evaluating may struggle to assist the 
parties in interacting productively174 without compromising their 
impartiality. 
The impending arbitration phase provides a carrot to "behave" 
that leads to settlement, but it also creates a competing incentive for 
the "Arb" to leak into the "Med." Placing the prospective decision-
maker in the room changes the dynamics and encourages advocates 
to operate as though in the arbitration. These incentives to "arbi-
trate" the mediation make the session far more formal and adver-
sarial than it might be otherwise and may limit the mediator's 
effectiveness and the prospects of reaching an agreement. In order to 
counter these tactics, the neutral must act more as a judge and less 
as a mediator, evaluating the legal merits, and pressuring the parties 
towards settlement by implicating, directly or indirectly, their au-
thority over settlement. The impartiality and confidentiality issues 
described increase the formality and the adversarial nature of the 
process and result in a process that is increasingly legal. 
F. Informed Consent to Use Med-Arb Does Not Protect Party Self-
Determination 
Med-Arb proponents describe self-determination and party 
choice as the solution to both the confidentiality and impartiality 
problems. Med-Arb advocates point to the importance of providing 
parties with a full understanding of the risk and benefits, and only 
undertaking Med-Arb "with the parties' full, voluntary consent."175 
The benefits, though, are not worth the risks. Implicitly, efforts seek-
ing to protect and fully inform pr~;>spective parties to Med-Arb require 
that the process be made increasingly formal and legalistic. The next 
Section reviews these arguments and describes how Med-Arb limits 
self-determination and choice. 
1. Informed Consent Corrects Med-Arb's Flaws 
Proponents ofMed-Arb believe that Med-Arb's detriments can be 
avoided through an informed and thorough mechanism of consent 
174. See Deason, supra note 95, at 224. 
175. See, e.g., Weisman, supra note 1, at 40 (noting "it is imperative that the medi-
ator-arbitrator describe both the benefits and criticisms of the process."). 
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prior to agreeing to Med-Arb. Indeed, this is the "silver bullet" argu-
ment that flexibility176 and choice are the hallmarks of ADR and re-
stricting the exercise of choice is overly rigid and paternalistic. Med-
Arb, where sophisticated parties contract for the dispute resolution 
option of their choice is, they argue, the epitome of flexibility and dis-
putant control. Med-Arb proponent John Blankenship argues "the 
process should be fashioned to fit the dispute, rather than the dispute 
to the process."177 Instead of viewing ADR processes as "unalterable 
process boxes" into which disputes must fit, ADR procedures should 
be "adaptable and combinable in order to best meet the needs of a 
particular dispute."178 Blankenship argues the "alternative" in ADR 
often means that only certain "alternatives" are available and that 
this harms flexibility and creativity.l79 Blind devotion to certain 
mechanisms is harmful to the field as a whole.l80 John Lande echoes 
these concerns when he noted that "[p]rocedures are inanimate phe-
nomena that should be means to ends, not ends in themselves ... [so] 
[i]nstead of investing so much of our cultural resources in myths 
about our most (or least) favorite procedures, we should invest more 
in realistic stories honoring people who work together to make good 
choices in using procedures to satisfy people's interest .... "18 1 In-
stead of arguing over the "correctness" of certain procedures, Lande 
and Blankenship frame the argument as one of individual prefer-
ences to tailor dispute mechanisms in ways that meet party interests. 
The notions that "one size does not fit all" and "flexibility and choice" 
are the hallmarks of ADR ignore the reality that ADR processes are 
now the primary mechanisms for resolving legal disputes and as a 
result they require careful examination. 
2. Informed Consent Does Not Provide True Self-
Determination 
Med-Arb, even when selected through a process of informed con-
sent, does not provide for party self-determination due to five main 
reasons. First, lawyers and the increased legalization of mediation 
176. See, e.g., Blankenship, supra note 2, at 33-34; Phillips, supra note 54, at 28 
(arguing that Med-Arb is the most flexible ADR process). 
177. Id. at 29. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 38. 
180. Id. 
181. John Lande, Shifting the Focus from the Myth of "The Vanishing Trial" to 
Complex Conflit Management Systems, or I Learned Almost Everything I Need to 
Know About Conflict Resolution from Marc Galanter, 6 CARDOZO J. CoNFLICT RESOL. 
191, 210-11 (2005). 
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curtail party self-determination. Second, increasing the legality of 
mediation by making the mediator also the arbitrator further curtails 
party self-determination. Third, informed consent to formal processes 
is not the same as informed consent to informal processes. Fourth, 
barriers to educating clients and their advocates about the dangers of 
Med-Arb make achieving truly informed consent difficult. Finally, 
even assuming self-determination to use Med-Arb, issues with edu-
cated party choice exist beyond the initial agreement. The resulting 
picture is one in which self-determination is not protected throughout 
Med-Arb by often complicated initial consent forms that in and of 
themselves further legalize the process. 
a. Lawyers and the Increased Legalization of Mediation 
Curtail Party Self-Determination 
Med-Arb advocates argue that sophisticated, represented parties 
should not be restricted in their ability to make such choices. These 
arguments can be countered by evidence indicating that procedural 
choice may relate more to the attorney's inclinations than the client's 
preferences. 182 The weight of research highlights participant prefer-
ence for non-adjudicative resolution procedures. In a 2004 study, 
Shestowsky found in two experiments that participants prefer dis-
pute resolution options that provide them the most control.183 Nota-
bly, parties preferred to present their own information without the 
assistance or filter of a representative. 184 Participants want "a neu-
tral third party to do no more than help them arrive at their own 
decision."185 Aspects of control that matter to disputants include "the 
level of formality or conversationality of the discussion, and who has 
the authority to determine when it is appropriate for the disputants 
to speak."186 Studies also indicate disputants prefer non-adjudicative 
procedures to adjudicative ones. 187 The legality of the subject matter 
does not necessarily influence the participants' dispute mechanism 
preferences.188 Simply put, disputants prefer processes that provide 
greater voice and participation, and these processes tend to be less 
182. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text. 
183. Lande, supra note 181, at 233. 
184. Id. at 243. 
185. Id. at 243. 
186. Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute Reso· 
lution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. 
L. REv. 63, 95 (2008). 
187. Shestowksy, supra note 33, at 220. 
188. Id. at 246. 
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formal and less legalistic. Further, an important benefit of dispu-
tants' preferences guiding procedural choices and direct participation 
in the resolution process is voluntary compliance with agreements. 189 
As a result, self-determination within the process leads to self-deter-
mined compliance after resolution. 
Despite party preferences for non-adjudicative procedures, self-
determination, and control, evidence suggests attorneys are the gate-
keepers to ADR. 19° Clients look to their lawyers for guidance on how 
to approach the dispute, 191 and clients are significantly influenced by 
their lawyer's preferences and tendencies regarding dispute resolu-
tion.192 Research indicates party self-determination to utilize infor-
mal dispute mechanisms is heavily mediated by attorney preferences. 
Brett and Shestowsky's research indicates that disputants' initial 
189. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 186, at 100 (citing Craig A. McEwen & Rich-
ard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Consensual Processes and Out-
comes, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD PARTY 
MEDIATION 53, 59, (Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt eds., 1989) (finding that dispu-
tants are more likely to comply with the agreement's terms if they think the agree-
ment was fair and they felt good about the mediation); Dean G. Pruitt, et al., Long-
Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 313, 327 (1993) (finding that 
parties believing a mediation was fair were more likely to comply with the agreement 
and to view an improvement in the relationship with the other party)). 
190. JEFFREY H. GoLDFIEN & JENNIFER K. RoBBENNOLT, What if the Lawyers Have 
Their Way? An Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes Toward Me-
diation Styles, 22 OHio ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 277, 287 (2007). 
191. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Us-
ing Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 
OHio ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 318 (1999) (arguing that clients are largely depen-
dent on attorneys for an analysis of their case and the pros and cons of a proposed 
settlement); cf, e.g., Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Dispu-
tant's Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARv. 
NEGOT. L. REv. 145, 166 (2001) (stating that lawyers are perceived as professionals 
with experience "to whom parties should defer"); 
192. See, e.g., AusTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND 
THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 20-21 (Oxford University 
Press. 1997) (describing research indicating that clients are relegated to secondary 
roles in litigation as lawyers view their involvement as hostile and seek to seek to 
limit it); Goldfien & Robbennolt, supra note 190, at 305-09 (finding that disputants 
are influenced by their lawyers' mediator preferences and conflict styles); Russell 
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the 
Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L. REv. 77, 82 (1997) (indicating support for the belief that 
lawyers have the ability to persuad litigants to approach the decision to settle or go to 
trial "from the lawyer's preferred analytical perspective."); Roselle L. Wissler, When 
Does Familiarity Breed Content?: A Study of the Role of Different Forms of ADR Edu-
cation and Experience in Attorneys' ADR Recommendations, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
199, 205 (2002) (observing the recommendation and encouragement of attorneys as a 
key factor in litigants' willingness to use ADR); see also, Shestowsky & Brett, supra 
note 186, 98-99 and accompanying footnotes (providing further citatinos in support of 
how lawyers influence disputants' choices 
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procedural preferences do not predict which settlement mechanism 
they later select.193 They posit three possible explanations for this 
behavior: (1) issues of time or cost may impact the procedural choice; 
(2) the opposing party preferred a different mechanism; or (3) attor-
neys were directing their clients' procedural choices.194 In analyzing 
the data, Shestowsky and Brett believe attorneys were not guiding 
their clients to the newly available mediation program and were also 
not inclined to negotiate.195 As the gatekeepers to ADR attorney pref-
erences guide client choices, curtailing client self-determination and 
leading to the use of more legalized alternatives like Med-Arb or eval-
uative mediation. 
Once in mediation, party self-determination is limited due to at-
torneys' preferences for evaluative processes that emphasize the law 
over the interests and the needs of the parties. The Model Standards 
of Conduct for Mediators defines the extent of self-determination. 
The Standards state, that "parties may exercise self-determination at 
any stage of a mediation, including mediator selection, process de-
sign, participation in or withdrawal from the process, and out-
comes."196 Under this definition, evaluative mediation offers parties 
a more limited version of self-determination. As described above, at-
torneys prefer evaluative mediation and seek mediators who have the 
legitimacy to mediate through their substantive expertise honed over 
years of litigating similar issues. Evaluative mediators legalize the 
process by often focusing exclusively on the legal issues in the case, 
by pressuring settlement, and by using mediation retainer agree-
ments that may include waivers of liability, including an expressed 
agreement that the mediator will be evaluating the legal merits of 
the dispute and providing settlement options. 
Ironically, when parties are dissatisfied with informal processes 
it is often because attorneys are primarily in control of negotiation.197 
This explanation is confirmed by Shestowsky and Brett's who found 
that 39.3% of negotiation participants were unable to identify the 
rules or basis for resolving their dispute. 198 This suggests that adju-
dicative procedures may involve the participation of disputants in 
193. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 186, at 97. 
194. ld. at 97-98. 
195. Id. at 98. 
196. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS supra note 121, at § I(A) 
197. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 186, at 101. 
198. ld. at 102. 
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ways that non-adjudicative procedures may not. 199 The formal mech-
anisms whereby disputants are included (attending the proceeding, 
acting as a witness) may provide for more participation than informal 
mechanisms handled exclusively by their attorneys. Ironically, with 
attorneys controlling informal processes, the parties' participation is 
limited at best. The procedural formality of adjudicative procedures 
may thus enhance disputants' perceptions of fairness. 200 
b. Increasing the Legality of Mediation by Making the 
Mediator also the Arbitrator Further Curtails Party Self-
Determination. 
Evidence of party perception of greater participation in more for-
mal adjudicative processes suggests that Med-Arb may provide 
greater self-determination than evaluative mediation. As neutrals in 
Med-Arb tend to be evaluative, Med-Arb must be viewed in light of 
the limited self-determination provided when selecting evaluative 
mediation. Med-Arb "choice" looks remarkably similar, and in fact 
may be a natural progression from this more legalized and adjudica-
tive form of mediation. In both instances "choice" occurs at the begin-
ning-stage decision of whether to utilize these processes and who to 
utilize as the neutral. These choices often impact the types of conver-
sations that take place in the mediation. In arbitration only legal 
norms will be enforced201 whereas in mediation, parties can agree to 
non-legal solutions. By pairing mediation with arbitration and plac-
ing the arbitrator in the mediation, it ensures that the mediation 
takes a decidedly legal tone and thus inherently legalizes the media-
tion, reducing party self-determination in favor of more legal 
arguments. 
c. Informed Consent to Formal Processes is Not the Same as 
Informed Consent to Informal Processes 
As the risks of Med-Arb are difficult for most parties to under-
stand without experiencing, legal definitions of informed consent are 
insufficient for ensuring self-determination to utilize the a hybrid 
process. Determining informed consent to mediate is not easy, com-
plicating the process of determining informed consent to utilize Med-
199. Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 
2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 90-91 (2002). 
200. E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of 
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & Soc'y REv. 953, 982 (1990). 
201. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environ-
mental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 116-17 (1995). 
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Arb.202 Generally legal informed consent is defined as "[a] person's 
agreement to allow something to happen, made with full knowledge 
of the risks involved and the alternatives."203 The Model Standards of 
Conduct for Mediators does not utilize the term informed consent, 204 
but Professor Nolan-Haley defines informed consent in mediation as 
"requir[ing] that parties be educated about mediation before they 
consent to participate in it."205 Further, informed consent "guards 
against coercion, ignorance, and incapacity that can impede the con-
sensual underpinnings of the mediation process."206 Informed con-
sent in formal processes like litigation or arbitration can thus be 
contrasted with informed consent to utilize informal processes like 
mediation. 
Informed consent in mediation is something that must be main-
tained throughout the process, and not simply achieved at the outset. 
Informed consent includes both "participation consent" and "outcome 
consent" and participation consent is not meaningful without a full 
understanding of the process.207 If"outcome consent" rests on media-
tor evaluation, the basis for the evaluation should be clear and in-
clude the mediator's expertise and, if applicable, highlight ways in 
which the evaluation is different than what a judge would recom-
mend.208 Underlying informed consent are the values of individual 
autonomy and self-determination. 209 
Determining the degree of information needed to make decisions 
"informed" is difficult due to the potential complexity of the subject 
matter and the sophistication level of the parties. 21° Five key ele-
ments must be addressed to achieve informed consent: disclosure, 
comprehension, voluntariness, competence, and consent.211 One "of 
202. See id. at 49. 
203. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009). 
204. Id. 
205. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Prin-
ciple for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L_ REv. 775, 812 (1999). 
206. Id. at 812. 
207. See id. at 819-20. 
208. LELA P. LoVE & JoHN W. CooLEY, Collision of Two Ideals: Legal Ethics and 
the World of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 21 OHio ST. J. ON DrsP. RESOL. 45, 54 
(2005). 
209. Ben Sones, A Tale of Two Countries: Parallel Visions for Informed Consent in 
the United States and United Kingdom, 39 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 253, 257 (2006) 
(Sones specifically describes these values in the U.S. healthcare context). 
210. Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Duty to Disclose Litigation Risks and Opportuni-
ties for Settlement: The Essence of Informed Decision-Making., 33 U. LA VERNE L_ REv. 
71, 76 (2011). 
211. Id. at 77 (citing RUTH R. FADEN AND TIM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THE-
ORY OF INFORMED CONSENT, 274 (1986)). 
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the key elements of clients having autonomy [and] decision-mak-
ing .. .is the information the lawyer provides to the client."212 In-
formed consent to utilize Med-Arb is very similar to informed consent 
when utilizing an evaluative mediation process. Both require a 
greater understanding of the hidden risks to a process combining for-
mal and informal processes. For example, the International Bar As-
sociation's Working Group, formulating Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International arbitration, 213 stated: 
Considering the sensitive position of the arbitrator as potential 
settlement facilitator ... the taskforce and the Working Group 
determined that the parties must give their express agreement 
prior to the commencement of such a process. This express 
agreement will be considered an effective waiver of any poten-
tial conflict of interest that might arise from the arbitrator's 
participation in settlement or from any information that the ar-
bitrator may learn in the process.214 
Understanding the limitations and risks associated with confi-
dentiality and impartiality make informed consent to utilize Med-Arb 
more complicated than informed consent to utilize mediation or arbi-
tration alone. In order to effectuate informed consent requires a dis-
cussion of the limitations and risks of Med-Arb and this in itself 
increases the legality of both the discussions and the result consent 
agreement itself. 
d. Barriers to Educating Clients and Their Advocates About 
the Dangers of Med-Arb Make Achieving Truly Informed 
Consent Difficult 
Entering into Med-Arb requires parties to be educated about the 
weaknesses inherent in the process. Love and Cooley argue that, sim-
ilar to entering into a Med-Arb process, party consent to engage in 
evaluative mediation should be "based on a clear understanding of 
the benefits, limitations, and risks associated with the process."215 
Love and Cooley argue that "relying on parties to study mediator re-
tainer agreements (when clients may rely on their lawyers for that 
service) would be a mistake," just as it might be a mistake to assume 
"that attorneys understand the difference between mediation and an 
212. KovACH, supra note 210, at 83. 
213. lNT'L BAR Ass'N, IBA GuiDELINEs oN CoNFLICTs OF INTEREST IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION (2004). 
214. Otto L 0 de Witt Wijnen et al., Background Information on the IBA Guide-
lines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 5 Bus. L. INT'L 433, 452 
(2004). 
215. Love & Cooley, supra note 208, at 56. 
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evaluative process."216 It may be difficult for clients to understand 
these issues without experiencing them first hand. With informed 
consent overseen difficult to guarantee or even monitor, and attorney 
preferences weighing heavily on party choices to utilize ADR,217 
party self-determination is uncertain at best. 
As an example of the challenges of educating parties about the 
dangers of combining formal and informal processes, Love and Cooley 
describe mediators who agree to offer an evaluation as a last resort in 
order to break impasse given the difficulty of determining what is a 
final impasse. Parties want an evaluation often because they believe 
it will be favorable. Their attorneys may want an evaluation because 
they believe it will benefit their clients or will make their clients 
more flexible. Love and Cooley thus caution that evaluations "are 
likely to disappoint one (or sometimes all) of the players."218 There-
fore, mixing informal and formal processes is something that inher-
ently pressures the impartiality and confidentiality of the informal 
process and makes self-determination difficult to achieve without un-
derstanding the complicated dynamics involved. 
Often Med-Arb is considered at the neutral's suggestion, and in 
such situations it is questionable as to whether true self-determina-
tion is taking place because parties may be agreeing to the process to 
avoid appearing disagreeable to the neutral. Arbitrator John Kagel 
argued that arbitrator-suggested mediation creates a difficult tactical 
problem for parties not wanting to offend their potential arbitrator 
and that the parties "will be subject to the same kind of subtle coer-
cion to settle in mediation as they were to getting there."219 Med-Arb 
proponent Gerald Phillips argues the risk-benefit analysis of Med-
Arb should be "made by the parties and their counsel, not by the neu-
tral."220 Weisman also cautions that it is imperative for the mediator-
arbitrator to describe both the process's benefits and criticism and 
that the scope of Med-Arb should always be in the hands of the par-
ties.221 Despite Weisman's best efforts to encourage self-determina-
tion, a detailed explanation of the benefits and criticisms of Med-Arb 
216. ld. at 65. 
217. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text. 
218. ld. at 69. 
219. JoHN KAGEL, Mediating Grievances, in ARBITRATION 1993 -ARBITRATION 
AND THE CHANGING WoRLD OF WoRK: PRoc. oF THE SIXTH ANN. MEETING oF THE NAT'L 
AcAD. OF ARB. 76, 78 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1994). 
220. Gerald F. Phillips, The Survey Says: Practitioners Cautiously Move Toward 
Accepting Same-Neutral Med-Arb, but Party Sophistication Is Mandatory, 26 ALTER-
NATIVES TO THE HIGH CoST OF LITIG. 101, 101 (2008). 
221. Weisman, supra note 1, at 40. 
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requires understanding the legal risks of weakened impartiality and 
confidentiality. Such discussions will be inevitably legal, and clients 
will defer to their attorney's preferences, making true self-determina-
tion elusive. The initial self-determination to agree to the process is 
often uninformed and insufficient because attorneys themselves do 
not understand the risks and the neutral suggesting the process may 
not effectively detail all the limitations of Med-Arb. 
In sum, the difficulties of determining self-determination and in-
formed consent to use an evaluative mediation process are not cor-
rected or improved by adding an arbitration component. Neither 
evaluative mediation nor Med-Arb provides for true informed consent 
about the risks of the process, and neither provides for adequate self-
determination. Executing truly informed consent will increase the le-
gality ofMed-Arb. As Professor Kristin Blankley indicates, courts are 
hesitant to uphold arbitration awards in Med-Arb when the parties 
have not expressly consented to the use of mediation communications 
in the arbitration. 222 Blankley argues that parties using Med-Arb 
must adequately provide in advance for confidentiality and informed 
consent.223 Such planning and careful drafting increases the formal-
ity and thus the legality of the process, because without such legali-
zation, the resulting arbitration agreement arising from a Med-Arb is 
vulnerable to being vacated under the Federal Arbitration Act.224 
There also may be issues about what specifically may be waiveable. 
While the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, for example, held parties 
agreeing to Med-Arb "waive[s] any due process rights attendant on 
the mediation and arbitration,"225 a party agreeing to arbitration 
does not surrender due process rights or mediation confidentiality 
rights.226 
222. Blankley, supra note 54, at 346-58. 
223. Id. at 358. 
224. Id. at 360. 
225. Peterson v. Peterson, No. 99-P-366 2002 WL 518481, at *1, (Mass. Ct. App. 
Apr. 5, 2002). 
226. DEASON, supra note 95, at 24 (also noting at 26 that a party agreeing to Med-
Arb does not surrender "the fundamental process rights of equal treatment and an 
opportunity to be heard that are associated with arbitration as well as litigation." Nor 
does the party "surrender the confidentiality rights associated with mediation." A 
party "trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the sim-
plicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
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e. Even Assuming Self-Determination to Use Med-Arb, Issues 
with Educated Party Choice Exist Beyond the Initial 
Agreement 
Assuming the actualization of party self-determination to utilize 
Med-Arb still may limit self-determination only to the decision point 
of entering into the process. The choice to settle in the mediation 
phase is certainly incentivized, 227 but it is not a decision that can be 
made unilaterally without the other side's agreement. Thus the de-
fault, agreement notwithstanding, is an agreement to arbitrate that 
is complete and binding upon agreeing to the combined process. 
The parties have an incentive to retain self-determination by 
reaching a mediated settlement. But what if one or both sides no 
longer see the neutral as impartial? Self-determination in mediation 
occurs throughout the process, not simply at the initial agreement 
stage. Parties in some respect are always negotiating for the third 
party neutral's perception, but Med-Arb elevates this to a greater de-
gree. Knowing that your mediator will become your arbitrator re-
quires that you attempt to persuade the neutral to see the issues 
from your point of view. If a mediation party shares information det-
rimental to their situation to the mediator, or if the mediator indi-
cates favoritism towards one party's position, a party may regret 
their decision to enter Med-Arb. Self-determination would be greater 
in Med-Arb if the parties could each opt out and select an alternative 
arbitrator.228 Touting finality and cost-savings as overriding values, 
Med-Arb agreements typically require parties to use the same neu-
tral for both phases and leave no recourse if either party is unhappy 
with the neutral's performance in mediation. 
Self-determination beyond the initial agreement also becomes an 
issue in deciding when the shift from mediation to arbitration will 
occur. If parties must jointly agree to transition to arbitration, it 
could indefinitely delay arbitration, but the same is true if one party 
refuses to participate in the arbitration phase.229 Bartel argues the 
transition ideally will not take place until both parties agree, but 
without that consent the only real solution is to vest the Med-Arbiter 
with the power to determine when the transition occurs.230 Such 
power could be used to stimulate compromise during the mediation, 
but might pre-maturely conclude the mediation because of slower-
227. Weisman, supra note 1, at 40. 
228. Deason, supra note 95, at 221. 
229. Bartel, supra note 66, at 683. 
230. ld. 
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than-desired progress.231 A lack of party control or certainty over 
when the process proceeds to arbitration harms the self-determina-
tion of the parties over the process. 
Further, the finality of arbitration impacts self-determination. 
While the parties are aware the neutral makes the final decision if 
they cannot reach an agreement, providing one neutral with the abil-
ity to mediate and render a binding decision can result in coercion by 
the neutral during the mediation.232 Neutrals may unknowingly sig-
nal their opinions on the dispute and influence the outcome of the 
mediation.233 Though the resolution may appear negotiated, the par-
ties may feel that it was imposed, which will diminish their satisfac-
tion and commitment to the result. 23 4 Efforts to ensure self-
determination and informed consent will result in increasingly tech-
nical and legal agreements to Med-Arb, and increasingly legalistic 
Med-Arb "mediation" sessions as the neutral pressures the parties to 
settle prior to the "arbitration" session. Correcting mediation's legali-
zation problem with arbitration raises a host of issues relating to con-
fidentiality, and impartiality. Informed consent does not provide self-
determination due to the barriers to understanding and making in-
formed choices. Without the ability to make truly informed consent, 
Med-Arb encourages legalized forms of both component processes and 
consequently limits the most essential aspect of mediation: party self-
determination and freedom of choice. The resulting story is one in 
which mediation's informality is severely curtailed and arbitration's 
finality is endangered. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
The rise of "legal" and more adversarial forms of mediation, and 
arbitration's increasing similarity to litigation makes Med-Arb at-
tractive as a means of "correcting'' for the legalization of these ADR 
processes. Parties struggling to settle in mediation need arbitration's 
finality, and parties unhappy with arbitration's similarity with trial 
need to add mediation's flexibility. Same neutral Med-Arb appears to 
231. Id. 
232. See id. at 683-84. 
233. THoMAS J. STIPANOWICH & PETER H. KAsKELL, CPR CoMM'N ON THE FuTURE 
oF ARB., CPR INsT. FOR DrsPUTE RESOL., CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITs BEsT: Sue. 
CESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BusiNESS UsERS 21 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kas-
kell eds., 2001); BARTEL, supra note 66, at 679-85. 
234. WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BREIT & STEPHEN B. GoLDBERG, GE'ITING Drs. 
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be a viable solution. But by requiring increasingly proscribed agree-
ments to achieve informed consent and opening the door to increased 
judicial scrutiny, same-neutral Med-Arb, in addition to violating fun-
damental tenets, will accelerate the legalization of both mediation 
and arbitration. The result of arbitration resembling litigation and 
mediation resembling arbitration is that our alternative processes 
are beginning to look more and more like the formal system itself. 
Professor Nolan-Haley argues that the blurring of mediation and ar-
bitration will leave disputing parties with little more than variations 
of adjudication. 235 
Parties are free to select same-neutral Med-Arb,236 but media-
tion and arbitration are available as subsequent but separate 
processes and can be utilized with a different neutral. Utilizing dif-
ferent neutrals may save money and time, given the risks posed by 
combing the two processes. For example, in an effort to save expense, 
many neutrals and parties skip the arbitral hearing as being duplica-
tive of the mediation. 237 Such a step places additional pressure on 
issues of candor (mediating while knowing that an informal arbitral 
record is being compiled), confidentiality (the ability to confront all 
arguments), impartiality (the arbitrator attempting to disregard cer-
tain information), procedural fairness (of having a record for pur-
poses of appeal), and informed consent (to waive key features of both 
processes). 
Despite speculation to the contrary,238 Med-Arb will not save 
time or expense for participants as it will be difficult to locate neu-
trals who can adequately perform both functions. An ideal Med-Arb 
neutral is equally skilled in both facilitative mediation and arbitra-
tion, but these are vastly different skills and mindsets. To conduct 
same-neutral Med-Arb correctly requires an individual with the sub-
stantive expertise to serve as the arbitrator and the exceptional 
facilitative skills to remain impartial during the mediation. Few legal 
mediators practice in this way limiting the pool of neutrals qualified 
to serve as a mediator and an arbitrator. 239 The skills of each role are 
very different. A decision-maker overseeing an adversary evidentiary 
235. Nolan-Haley, supra note 6, at 1, 65. 
236. Deason, supra note 95, at 224 ("Parties are free to elect a combined process 
despite these practical and functional limitations."). 
237. Phillips, supra note 54, at 28. 
238. I d. at 28 (Because selecting a new arbitrator is time-consuming, considerable 
time is saved by having the mediator become the arbitrator. Further, there is no need 
to catch up a new arbitrator on the details of the dispute if the same-neutral is used 
for both processes.). 
239. Bartel, supra note 66, at 688. 
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hearing may not be able to facilitate discussions of parties crafting 
their own agreements and vice versa.240 Many regard these diametri-
cally opposed roles as fundamentally "incompatible."241 
In fact, same-neutral Med-Arb may actually require more time 
and money than different-neutral Med-Arb. Time and cost savings 
gained by settling a dispute in mediation are lessened considerably if 
attorneys must also prepare for and treat the mediation as an arbi-
tral hearing. In the 2008 Wissler Survey of Ohio lawyers examining 
settlement conferences versus mediations, lawyers surveyed agreed 
or strongly agreed at a rate of 63% that judges assigned to the case 
made good use of parties' resources. 242 Only volunteer mediators re-
ceived a lower rating (57%) with non-assigned judges (67%), court 
mediators (80%) and private mediators (71 %) all viewed as a better 
use of party resources. 243 This evidence suggests that mediators are a 
more effective use of resources than judges and suggests that a neu-
tral's binding authority does not necessarily equate with time and 
cost savings. 
To remedy the cost of Med-Arb, Professor Blankley proposes cre-
ating "a financial disincentive for the mediator to arbitrate," ensuring 
costs savings by 'pay[ing] the neutral a premium if the case settles in 
mediation."244 This proposal would save the parties money, but 
would put an extraordinary amount of pressure on settlement and 
potentially damage the neutral's impartiality and the parties' self-
determination. With these risks, different-neutral Med-Arb is the 
better option as it avoids the confidentiality, impartiality, and other 
issues of utilizing the same neutral. 
Further analysis is required to answer underlying questions re-
garding whether the careful combination of formal and informal per-
mutations can provide access to justice at greater speed and lower 
cost. Arguments that these are solely private processes and it is pa-
ternalistic to proscribe limitations on dispute system choices are 
shortsighted as they do not examine or address systematic access to 
justice issues and the proper role of formal and informal dispute 
mechanisms. As Professor Sternlight's cautions, "it would be a real 
mistake ... to simply allow our procedural system of justice to evolve 
240. Sussman, supra note 1, at 73. 
241. STIPANOWICH & KAsKELL, supra note 233, at 20. 
242. Wissler, supra note 89, at 297. 
243. Id. 
244. Blankley, supra note 54, at 328 (also noting that discounted rates can be 
agreed to for providing both mediation and arbitration services in order to adequately 
protect both the parties). 
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on its own."245 The use of same neutral Med-Arb has evolved on its 
own, and the risks clearly outweigh the rewards. 
245. Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a 
System of Justice, 3 NEV. L. J. 289, 303 (2002-2003). 

